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Discursive framing in private and public communication by pro-nuclear corporate, 
political and regulatory actors following the Fukushima disaster
Purpose – The study examines a case of companies cooperating with the State to prevent a 
public controversy over nuclear power following the Fukushima disaster and achieve mutually 
beneficial policy outcomes. It analyses the private and public communication of pro-nuclear 
corporate, political and regulatory actors.
Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on political economy theory, the study examines 
how actors mobilised power by accessing an existing social network to agree a joint public 
communication strategy in order to ensure public support for the continuation of nuclear power 
generation in the UK. It traces discursive frames from their inception in private communication 
to their reproduction in public communication and their dissemination via the media.
Findings – The study provides evidence of pro-nuclear actors cooperating behind the scenes 
to achieve consistent public pro-nuclear messaging. It finds evidence of four discursive frames: 
(1) avoiding knee-jerk reactions, (2) lessons learned, (3) safety, and (4) nuclear renaissance. 
In combination, they guide audiences’ evaluation of the consequences of the Fukushima 
disaster for the UK in favour of continuing the commercial use of nuclear energy.
Originality/value – The private e-mail exchange between pro-nuclear actors presents a unique 
opportunity to examine the mobilisation of less visible forms of power in the form of agenda 
setting (manipulation) and discursive framing (domination) in order to influence policy 
outcomes and shape public opinion on nuclear energy. This is problematic because it 
constitutes a lack of transparency and accountability on part of the State with respect to policy 
outcomes and restricts the civic space by curtailing the articulation of alternative interests and 
voices.
Keywords: Civil society, Discursive framing, Fukushima, Intertextuality, Nuclear industry, 
Power. 
Article Classification: Research paper
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1. Introduction
The commercial use of nuclear power as a means of meeting energy demands has been a 
contested issue since its inception in the 1950s (European Nuclear Society, 2017). Proponents 
argue that nuclear power is safe and necessary to ensure energy security and to prevent global 
warming, whilst keeping energy prices low. Opponents contend that nuclear power is “dirty, 
dangerous and expensive” (Greenpeace, 2012) due to the unsolved issue of nuclear waste 
storage, the military use of nuclear technology, the risk and adverse consequences of nuclear 
accidents, and the high construction cost of nuclear power plants. Nuclear accidents, such as 
the Three Mile Island accident in the US in 1979, the Chernobyl disaster in the former USSR 
in 1986, and the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011, tend to ignite public controversies over 
nuclear energy. Resulting anti-nuclear sentiment may put pressure on governments to change 
their energy policy and cause a legitimacy threat to nuclear operators. Governments of 
countries reliant on nuclear power to meet energy demands and the nuclear industry share an 
interest in the continuation of nuclear energy generation. They may thus cooperate to avert a 
public controversy over nuclear energy in the aftermath of nuclear accidents. We view 
companies as political actors, with politics constituting “an activity that rearranges relations 
between people and the distribution of goods … though the mobilisation of power” (Fleming 
and Spicer, 2014, p. 239). We focus on the cooperation of powerful economic and political 
interests in the form of the UK nuclear industry and the State to influence the decisions, values, 
and preferences of civil society on nuclear energy in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. 
The overarching research question, which guides our study, is the following:
RQ: How did UK corporate, political, and regulatory actors prevent a public 
controversy over nuclear power in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster?
Public controversies constitute public debates on contested issues and conflicting ideas with 
the aim of influencing policy outcomes. They take place in the civic space, which is a site for 
open public debate and involves participation by individual citizens, groups of civil society 
actors, including social movement groups, NGOs, and the media (Castells, 2008).1 The civic 
space is “at the heart of democracy”, where “the rights of civil society exist alongside other 
powerful economic and political interests” (Murphy and Moerman, 2018, p. 1774).  It plays an 
important role in “structuring and channeling debates ver diverse ideas and conflicting 
interests” (Castells, 2008, p. 78). Conversely, stifling public debate over issues of public 
interest entails shrinking the civic space. This is detrimental for democracy, as it denies human 
and civil rights, jeopardises government accountability, silences citizen voices and erodes 
confidence in government authority (Malena, 2015, p. 14). 
We examine a case where pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors cooperated 
behind the scenes to stifle public debate on nuclear energy in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
disaster. Beelitz and Merkl-Davies (2012) examine how a Swedish energy company restored 
organisational legitimacy following an incident in one of their nuclear power plants in Germany 
by means of analysing managerial discourse (‘CEO-speak’) in corporate public 
communication. In contrast, we focus on the responses of corporate, political, and regulator 
actors to a nuclear accident in which none of the actors were implicated in nor responsible for, 
but which threatened the legitimacy of nuclear power. Cho et al. (2018) contrast the ‘backstage’ 
corporate political activities of oil and gas firms in the form of lobbying and political party 
contributions aimed at influencing US law to allow oil drilling in environmentally sensitive 
1 The concept of the civic space is based on Habermas’ (1970) work of the public sphere which denotes “the ideal 
of a public deliberative space, or discursive arena, where all citizens have an opportunity to contribute to 
collective decisions” (Murphy and Moerman, 2018, p. 1780).
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areas in Alaska with their ‘frontstage’ discourse on environmental protection. In contrast, we 
examine the ‘backstage’ corporate political activities in the form of accessing existing pro-
nuclear networks for agenda-setting purposes with the aim of agreeing a joint ‘frontstage’ 
public communication strategy on the Fukushima disaster. By tracing discursive frames from 
their inception in private communication (e-mails) to their reproduction in public 
communication (corporate, political and regulatory news releases and documents) and their 
dissemination via the media (newspaper articles), we provide linguistic evidence that pro-
nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors cooperated behind the scenes to achieve 
consistent public pro-nuclear messaging in order to ensure continued public support for the 
continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK. For this purpose, they drew on and 
contributed to pre-existing dominant frames on nuclear energy and crisis response and 
resolution in order to prevent alternative frames from becoming prominent. This enabled them 
to reinforce their hegemonic interpretations of reality, thus preventing a public controversy 
over the commercial use of nuclear energy in the UK. We find evidence of four discursive 
frames, which originate in the private e-mail exchange and are reproduced in public 
communication and newspaper articles. These include (1) avoiding knee-jerk reactions, (2) 
lessons learned, (3) safety, and (4) nuclear renaissance. They guide audiences’ evaluation of 
the consequences of the Fukushima disaster for the UK in favour of the continuation of nuclear 
power generation. 
The theoretical assumptions underpinning our study are based on political economy theory, 
and Fleming and Spicer’s (2014) conceptualisation of organisational power as manipulation 
and as domination. Political economy theory views economic activity as embedded in the 
political, social, and institutional framework in which it takes place (Gray et al., 1995). 
Research therefore foregrounds power and conflict in society and the role of corporate 
reporting in balancing the interests of a range of interested parties, including the State (Guthrie 
and Parker, 1990). Corporate reports are viewed as a tool for “constructing, sustaining, and 
legitimising economic and political arrangements, institutions and ideological themes, which 
contribute to the corporation’s private interests” (Guthrie and Parkers, 1990, p. 166). The study 
focuses on power as manipulation and as domination as a means of furthering the vested 
interests of nuclear industry and UK government. Manipulation is a mostly invisible form of 
power, which involves accessing social networks for agenda setting purposes. We focus on 
corporate, political and regulatory actors tapping into an existing pro-nuclear social network to 
agree a joint public communication strategy in order to ensure public support for the 
continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK. By contrast, domination entails mobilising 
discursive and ideological resources in order to attain desirable outcomes and goals, while 
curbing the articulation of other interests and voices (Fleming and Spicer, 2014, p. 260). We 
focus on the way pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors drew on and contributed 
to dominant discursive frames to influence public opinion on nuclear energy in the aftermath 
of the Fukushima disaster, thus maintaining the status quo. For this purpose, we utilise the 
concepts of intertextuality (Fairclough, 2003) and discursive framing (Entman, 1993; Benford 
and Snow, 2000; Fiss and Zajac, 2006; Cornellisen et al., 2011; Cornellisen and Werner, 2014). 
The study draws on and contributes to three streams of literature, namely (1) the political 
economy of accounting focusing on the relationship between companies, civil society, and the 
State, (2) corporations as political actors exercising power to achieve either shared or contested 
goals, and (3) the cross-disciplinary literature on framing. The prior corporate reporting 
literature has largely neglected the relationship between companies and the State. We regard 
the State as an interested party in policy formation and therefore pursuing common interests 
with companies, which are not necessarily in the public interest. Prior studies on corporations 
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as political actors predominately focus on manipulation, i.e., corporate power abuse by means 
of lobbying and political party donations (Cho et al., 2006; Cho et al., 2018). The Freedom of 
Information request and subsequent publication of an e-mail exchange by pro-nuclear 
corporate, political, and regulatory actors by The Guardian provides us with a unique 
opportunity to examine power as manipulation by tapping into an existing pro-nuclear social 
network for agenda setting purposes, and power as domination by agreeing a joint public 
communication strategy to influence public opinion on nuclear energy. This is problematic for 
two reasons. First, it constitutes a lack of transparency and accountability on part of 
government. Second, it curtails the articulation of alternative interests and voices by both 
government and the nuclear industry (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Finally, the concept of 
discursive framing has been used in the social movement and media studies literature to 
examine how social movement actors and the media construct the meaning of controversial 
issues in order to “influence the interpretations of reality among various audiences” (Fiss and 
Hirsch, 2005, p. 30). Only a handful of studies utilise the concept of framing in the analysis of 
corporate communication (e.g., Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Ascui and Lovell, 2011; 
Waller and Conaway, 2011). However, it has not been employed as a primary analytical 
framework in the corporate communication literature to explore how companies strategically 
draw on and contribute to frames to influence audience perceptions of either controversial 
issues or organisational decisions, actions or outcomes. What is more, while the prior literature 
predominantly seems to assume that frames “arrive in ‘raw form’” (Abolafia, 2004, p. 351), 
we emphasise the extent to which corporate actors strategically reinterpret and recombine pre-
existing frames to legitimate particular arguments and solutions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the prior empirical literature and 
develops the theoretical framework. Section Three discusses the background of the study, 
including the commercial use of nuclear power and reactions to the Fukushima disaster. The 
data and the method of analysis are outlined in Section Four. Section Five presents the findings. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of findings and provides recommendations for future 
research in Section Six.
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
We adopt a political economy perspective of corporate communication to examine the attempts 
of pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors to legitimate nuclear energy in the UK 
after the Fukushima disaster. Viewing corporations as political actors, we employ an analytical 
framework based on the concept of discursive framing to analyse the private and public 
communication of pro-nuclear actors. For this purpose, we draw on three strands of literature, 
which are discussed in Sections 2.1 to 2.3.
2.1 A political economy framework of corporate reporting and organisational legitimation
A political economy lens of corporate communication recognises power and conflict in society 
and views corporate reports as “a product of interchange between the corporation and its 
environment and attempt to mediate and accommodate a variety of sectional interests” 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1990, p. 166). The majority of the corporate reporting literature employing 
political economy theory focuses on the relationship between companies and shareholders, 
stakeholders, or civil society (Gray et al., 1995; Williams and Adam, 2013; Lauwo et al., 2016). 
A small number of studies pay attention to interactions between companies and the State 
(Archel et al., 2009; Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2016; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016). Public 
interest theory assumes that the State acts as a neutral arbiter between interest groups (e.g., 
companies and their employees or companies and environmental NGOs) in an attempt to 
resolve conflict and represent public interest. However, in line with political economy theory, 
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we assume that the State has its own interests, which may not always align with public interest.2 
In this case, the government may pursue its own interests or cooperate with groups of social 
actors to pursue common interests. If the government cooperates with companies to pursue 
common interests, which are not in the public interest, this creates a problem of accountability 
for both companies and government. The notion of accountability is central to both the 
relationship between companies and its key stakeholders and civil society and to the 
relationship between government and citizens. In the case of companies, accountability arises 
from the responsibility to provide an account of their activities and impacts on stakeholders 
and civil society. In the case of government, accountability arises from the responsibility to 
represent the interests of the electorate. In this scenario, corporate reporting may be used 
strategically to advance and protect the interests of companies and politicians, rather than the 
public interest (Williams and Adams, 2013).
The prior accounting literature has investigated instances where the State did not act as a neutral 
arbiter, but cooperated with corporations to pursue common interests. Archel et al. (2009) 
examine the role of the Spanish State during Volkswagen’s attempt to introduce a new 
production system in its plant in Spain, which was met with protests and strikes. They argue 
that the State and Volkswagen pursued common interests, as the State’s ultimate goal of 
economic growth depended on Volkswagen’s profit-making ability. The authors find that 
Volkswagen and the State aligned their discourses in their public reporting to oppose the 
discourse of employees. Specifically, both parties mobilised the same discursive and 
ideological resources in their public discourses, by highlighting the importance of economic 
growth and profitability. Siddiqui and Uddin (2016) examine the role of the Bangladeshi State 
with respect to corporate accountability following the collapse of a factory building housing 
the production of ready-made garments in April 2013. They identify a ‘state-business nexus’ 
(p. 679) which acted in their own interests in order to perpetuate their powerful positions, and 
at the same time enabled and perpetuated human rights violations. Both the State and 
businesses denied responsibility and avoided accountability, while silencing counter voices by 
trade unions or human rights organisations. In contrast, Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2016) 
examine an instance where the interests of the State and corporations are not in line and where 
both parties compete over power. They investigate the changes in the corporate reporting on 
community issues by Mauritian companies in response to changing regulations and identify a 
discursive struggle between the corporate discourse and the government discourse. This 
resulted from corporate actors and government actors struggling for power over who controls 
the funds raised following the introduction of a mandatory corporate social investment levy. 
The study highlights that the State does not always necessarily privilege powerful actors, but 
may also act in the interests of other groups of social actors, or in their own interests. 
2.2 Corporations as political actors
Corporations are political actors in the sense that they exercise power to achieve goals, with 
power constituting “the capacity to influence other actors with these political interests in mind” 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2014, p. 239). Corporate power manifests in four ways, namely coercion, 
manipulation, domination, and subjectification (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). Coercion is a direct 
and explicit mode of power whereby one person “make[s] another person […] do something 
they would not otherwise do” (p. 242). By contrast, manipulation is more covert and involves 
agenda setting by means of persuasion or by accessing key social networks. Agenda setting 
entails prefixing the decision-making parameters civil society actors use to make sense of an 
2 In line with ICAEW (2012) we consider public interest to have been satisfied, if ex ante, the welfare of the 
representative individual has been considered in the decision-making process.acc 
Page 5 of 48 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal6
issue (p. 256). Domination originates in Lukes’ (2005) radical concept of power and entails 
shaping perceptions and ideological values of actors in such a way that hierarchical relations 
of power seem normal and inevitable and are thus largely invisible (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). 
Domination involves managing and controlling other social actors in the field by mobilising 
discursive resources to attain political goals, while curbing the articulation of other interests 
and voices (p. 260). Finally, subjectification entails influencing and shaping a person’s 
emotions and identify in a way that their particular standing and way of being within a 
particular social order appears normal and inevitable to them (p. 245). 
All four types of corporate power have been empirically examined in the accounting literature 
and linked to a lack of accountability and transparency to stakeholders and civil society. Our 
summary of the prior literature pays particular attention to manipulation and domination, as 
they are pertinent for the current study. Coercion and manipulation are episodic forms of 
power, which manifest in identifiable acts of exerting direct influence, including lawsuits, 
lobbying, and political party donations. Murphy and Moerman (2018) focus on coercion by 
McDonalds in the form of corporate lawsuits against individuals opposing the construction of 
a store in Australia. They argue that coercion is used to “limit the “ability” of others to provide 
an “account” within participatory democratic accountability processes”, thus stifling public 
debate, impeding accountability mechanisms, and ultimately undermining democratic 
principles. By contrast, lobbying and electoral funding constitute direct, but less visible forms 
of corporate power as manipulation. Lobbying helps “to facilitate the work of legislators with 
agendas consonant with business interests or other advocacy groups” (Walker and Rea, 2014, 
p. 288). Alternatively, corporations may influence legislation to their advantage by funding 
electoral candidates or political parties. Cho et al. (2006) examine whether companies with 
poor environmental performance in environmentally sensitive industries spend more on 
election campaigns. They find that poorer performers disclose more environmental information 
and have higher political expenditure, which suggests that they strategically manage their 
political risk exposure. Cho et al. (2018) show how US oil and gas firms used lobbying 
activities and party contributions to influence the passage of a bill to allow oil drilling in 
environmentally sensitive areas in Alaska. They contrast these ‘backstage’ corporate political 
activities of US oil and gas firms with their ‘frontstage’ discourse on environmental protection. 
They find that firms used their CSR reports to present themselves as committed to 
environmental protection. We add to the literature on manipulation by focusing on agenda 
setting by means of accessing key social networks with the purpose of aligning public policy 
decision-making with the vested interests of companies and the State. 
Domination and subjectification are systemic and less visible forms of power which entail the 
mobilisation of “institutional, ideological, and discursive resources” (Fleming and Spicer, 
2014, p. 240) to achieve political goals. Corporate reports draw on and contribute to dominant 
discourses on contested issues, thus curbing the articulation of other interests and voices. For 
example, Spence (2007) notes that social and environmental reporting is a hegemonic practice 
motivated by obfuscating conflict and antagonism, rather than providing transparent 
information. This, in turn, endangers democracy and reinforces the hegemony of corporations. 
Against the background of public demand for and debate on sustainable development, Milne 
et al. (2009) highlight how an aggregate of businesses in New Zealand constructed a discourse 
of sustainability that drew both on economic and ecological ideologies and made them appear 
as experts and leaders on sustainable development, allowing them to “reinforce rather than 
challenge the status quo” (p. 1241). This demonstrates how the mobilisation of ideological and 
discursive resources can obfuscate underlying corporate behaviours and practices and thus 
serve economic, rather than ecological ends. The “inconsistencies between publicly visible 
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corporate reporting and their less visible political activities” highlighted by Cho et al. (2018, 
p. 866) also demonstrate how corporations may use their corporate reporting strategically to 
influence audience perceptions of their social and environmental practices and performance, 
while influencing legislation to ensure the status quo in maintained in relation to CSR. 
Corporate reporting may thus serve as a means of providing accounts in a self-serving manner 
and marginalising alternative accounts of social movement groups or NGOs, thus inhibiting 
pluralist and democratic debates (Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 
2017). 
2.3 Discursive framing
The concept of framing originates in the work of Goffman (1974) and is based on the 
assumption that the meaning of events and issues is socially constructed. Frames are “resources 
for ongoing meaning construction” (Werner and Cornellisen, 2014, p. 1454). The concept has 
been applied in a variety of academic disciplines, including psychology, economics, linguistics, 
political science, and media studies, to study a range of phenomena, including decision-making 
and public opinion and policy formation (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Lakoff, 2010a; 
Benford and Snow, 2000; Chong and Druckman, 2007). We build on the social movement and 
media sociology literature on discursive framing, i.e., how social actors and the media construct 
the meaning of issues in order to influence audiences’ interpretations (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). 
In an organisational context discursive framing has been used to examine how individuals use 
frames to initiate and justify change, but also to resist change and maintain the status quo (Fiss 
and Zajac, 2006; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). Although employing 
a rhetorical analysis as a primary analytical lens, Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2014) draw on 
the concepts of framing and reframing in their analysis of a controversy between multi-national 
apparel companies and Greenpeace over pollution in their supply chain. Our study is most 
similar to Waller and Conaway (2011) who employ the concepts of framing and counter-
framing to explore how Nike restores its reputation after being targeted over poor labour 
practices in its supply chain in South-East Asia, resulting in widespread and sustained negative 
media coverage. 
Discursive framing assumes that social actors use a range of linguistic and rhetorical devices, 
particularly figurative language, including metaphors and similes (Waller and Conaway, 2011), 
to influence audiences’ perceptions, evaluations, and decisions. Framing is a sense-giving 
process, which involves strategically constructing schemata, which guide audiences’ 
understanding and interpretation of an issue, with the attempt to influence their sense-making 
processes (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). It entails selecting a specific aspect of social reality and 
making it more salient, whilst obscuring other aspects, with the purpose of fostering a specific 
interpretation of the situation (Entman, 1993). Over time, frames become institutionalised in 
the form of cultural frames and internalised by individuals as cognitive frames (Lakoff, 2010b). 
What is more, discursive framing does not occur in a vacuum, but has to be considered in 
context (Cornellisen et al., 2011). Social actors cannot simply impose any representation of 
reality on their audiences. Frames have to resonate with the norms, values and beliefs of target 
audiences in order to be accepted (Benford and Snow, 2000). When framing an event or issue 
in a particular way, social actors draw on and contribute to pre-existing cultural frames, which 
are strategically reinterpreted and recombined to legitimate particular arguments and solutions. 
As frames are used to promote goals and agendas and to achieve outcomes, which benefit 
specific groups of people, they are inherently political (Waller and Conaway, 2011). Social 
actors may reproduce pre-existing dominant frames in order to maintain the status q o. 
Alternatively, social actors may question the status quo by reframing an issue. If a particular 
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frame achieves sufficient prominence, it contributes to the resolution of an issue of public 
concern (Waller and Conaway, 2011). 
The media plays an important role in this process, as it provides interpretive frames on specific 
events and issues to the public (Butler et al., 2013). Ultimately, the range of interpretive frames 
provided in the media and whether a frame is more or less prominent will have an impact on 
public opinion formation. Social movement groups and policy elites therefore aim to get the 
media to pick up a frame, which promotes their own interests, and disseminate it to civil society 
in order to gain support for a particular issue or course of action (Waller and Conway, 2011). 
This is referred to as ‘frame sponsorship’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). As crises undermine 
hegemonic interpretations of reality, they may give rise to ‘framing contests’ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000) or ‘frame disputes’ (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005) amongst different groups of social 
actors struggling for power over contested interpretations of reality (Carragee and Roefs, 2004; 
Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). The outcomes of such framing contests have an impact on policy 
formation. For this reason, social actors may have an interest in preventing public controversies 
from arising in the first place. They may do so by strategically reinforcing dominant frames to 
prevent alternative frames from becoming prominent.
Drawing on the three strands of literature outlined in this section, we view public controversies 
as taking place in the civic space, which is a discursive arena where civil society actors, 
companies, and the State debate issues resulting in public policy. Adopting a political economy 
perspective, we recognise that power is not equally distributed in society and that the State is 
not a neutral arbiter in public debates. Rather, companies and the State constitute powerful 
political actors with vested interests. They may cooperate to pursue common interests and aim 
to influence public policy outcomes. For this purpose, they mobilise power to achieve mutually 
beneficial outcomes and exclude civil society actors from decision-making on public policy, 
thus preventing alternative voices from being heard. This shrinks the civic space and results in 
public policy not being the outcome of pluralist decision-making (Archel et al., 2009). 
3. Case background
This section provides the context of our study, which includes the commercial use of nuclear 
power and nuclear policy in the UK (Section 3.1), the Fukushima disaster and resulting public 
and political responses across Europe and in the UK, as well as UK media coverage (Section 
3.2). 
3.1 The commercial use of nuclear power
The first nuclear power plants generating electricity for commercial use began operating in 
Russia in 1954 and in the UK in 1956 (European Nuclear Society, 2017). Nuclear energy 
generation flourished across the globe for over two decades, until two major nuclear incidents 
exposed the risks involved. The Three Mile Island accident in the U.S. in 1979 and the 
Chernobyl disaster in the former USSR in 1986 highlighted that nuclear accidents can result in 
major contamination of the environment and in health hazards for communities for decades to 
come. The popularity of nuclear energy declined in the late 1980s due to three factors, namely 
(1) increased public opposition following nuclear accidents, (2) high running costs of nuclear 
power plants (amongst others due to higher regulatory cost following the incidents), and (3) 
the increasing use of gas-generated energy (Elliot, 2013). However, at the turn of the 20th 
century governments worldwide began to actively promote nuclear power generation. This 
global trend was coined ‘nuclear renaissance’ and justified by supporters as a means of tackling 
climate change and providing energy security (Elliot, 2013, p. 11). With increasing global 
instability over the last decade governments worldwide have been concerned about future 
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energy security and have aimed to be independent from energy imports. Climate change has 
been an increasing concern for governments and civil society since the 1990s. The ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol entailed 53 countries committing themselves to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2012 in order to combat global warming. Against this background, supporters of 
nuclear power generation have argued that it is the most affordable option to fight global 
warming due its low carbon emissions. 
The ‘nuclear renaissance’ also played out in the UK with the government’s attitude towards 
nuclear energy changing dramatically. When New Labour came into power in 1997 it 
emphasised the promotion of renewables and had no plans to promote nuclear power. In 2005, 
the possibility of expanding nuclear power was first suggested. This was heavily criticised, due 
to a lack of public consultation and perceived as the result of lobbying by the nuclear industry 
(Aldred and Stoddard, 2008). Despite criticism, New Labour went ahead with its plans for 
nuclear new builts, releasing White Papers on nuclear power in 2007 and 2008. The expansion 
of nuclear power generation in the UK was also pushed by the nuclear industry, especially by 
EDF and the German utility company E.On, which called for “replac[ing] nuclear with 
nuclear”, which entails building new nuclear power stations on old sites (Elliot, 2013, p. 47). 
Both companies enjoyed “strong state support, in kind if not in direct finance” (p. 45). Any 
expansion had to be financed by the industry and not via government subsidies (Butler et al., 
2013). In return, the industry demanded a supportive investment environment and security 
(Elliot, 2013).
3.2 Reponses to the Fukushima disaster
The Fukushima disaster unfolded on Friday, 11th March 2011, when an earthquake with the 
magnitude of 9.0 erupted off the coast of Japan, triggering a powerful tsunami. The tsunami 
swept across the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, flooding buildings and the emergency 
generators. As the cooling system came to a halt, reactor buildings exploded due to mounting 
pressure and nuclear meltdowns occurred. Surrounding land, air and water were contaminated. 
The Japanese Government introduced a 30-kilometre exclusion zone around the plant, which 
is still in place to this day. Images of the disaster and its impact were distributed worldwide via 
the media. The Fukushima disaster represents the worst nuclear accident to date, after the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Both events were ranked as a level 7 event on the International 
Nuclear Event Scale, representing a ‘major event’. Consequently, the perceived risk of nuclear 
power generation increased across the globe and rekindled the public debate on nuclear safety. 
What is more, it called into question the future of nuclear power at a time, when governments 
worldwide were actively promoting nuclear power as a means of combatting climate change 
and providing energy security and independence (Elliot, 2013).
Consequently, governments of countries that had previously committed to nuclear power had 
to reassure the public of nuclear safety, as nuclear energy policies are heavily dependent on 
public acceptance and support. Public responses and subsequent policy outcomes to the 
Fukushima disaster differed significantly across Europe. Germany, Switzerland and Belgium 
decided to phrase out nuclear power due to strong anti-nuclear public sentiment. All three 
countries had an existing fleet of nuclear reactors, with plans to expand nuclear power 
generation. Germany experienced the strongest anti-nuclear sentiment. Having had just 
recently decided on expanding the lifespans of Germany’s nuclear power plants, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel saw herself under such great pressure that she decided on 29 May 2011 to phase 
out all nuclear reactors by 2022 (Elliot, 2013). In the Netherlands, the government decided to 
abandon its plans to build a second nuclear power plant. Public opposition to nuclear power 
also increased in France, Spain, Sweden, Finland, and Eastern and Central Europe, but not to 
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the extent that governments were forced to change their existing nuclear energy policies. The 
Italian government saw itself forced to abandon plans to re-engage with nuclear power 
generation following a public vote (Elliott, 2013). 
Compared to other European countries, there was little public debate on nuclear energy 
following the Fukushima disaster in the UK (Elliott, 2013). This may be due to a sustained pro-
nuclear campaign by the UK government and the nuclear industry preceding the Fukushima 
disaster portraying nuclear power as a means of reducing carbon emissions and securing future 
energy supplies (Poortinga et al., 2013). We discuss the dominant pro-nuclear frames pushed 
by the UK government preceding the Fukushima disaster in Section 4.2. After a mere two-
month consultation period and hardly any discussion of the implications of the Fukushima 
disaster on nuclear safety in Parliament, the UK government announced its plans to continue 
with nuclear power generation on 18 May 2011. A day after the disaster Chris Huhne, the 
Secretary of State of Energy and Climate Change, asked Mike Weightman, Chief Inspector of 
Nuclear Installations and Head of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), to compile a report 
on the implications of the events at Fukushima for the UK nuclear industry (the Weightman 
Report). The ONR is the UK regulatory body responsible for nuclear safety and security at 
nuclear sites in the UK. As Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne 
represented the interests of the Government, which relied on the continued use of nuclear 
energy to ensure the future supply of affordable energy and to reduce carbon emissions. The 
UK Committee on Climate Change released a report on 9 May 2011, recommending that 
nuclear energy continued to be part of the UK’s future energy mix in order to meet climate-
change goals. The Weightman report was published on 18 May 2011 stating that, from a safety 
perspective, there was no need to phase out nuclear power in the UK. This report formed the 
basis for the National Policy Statement issued in July 2011, confirming the selection of eight 
sites for new nuclear reactors (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011). In fact, 
parliamentary support for nuclear energy increased from 80 percent in 2010 to 98 percent in 
July 2011 (Elliot, 2013, p. 45). Table 1 provides a timeline of events.
[Table 1 about here]
As events unfolded in Japan, the UK media coverage of the Fukushima disaster was extensive 
and detailed. However, it did not stay in the headlines for long and was not portrayed as a major 
catastrophe (Wittneben, 2012). The broadcast media “adopt[ed] a sensationalist approach, but 
calming views concerning implications were usually also presented” (Elliot, 2013, p. 51). What 
is more, the BBC allegedly broadcast programmes in support of nuclear energy very soon after 
the disaster. The UK media offered few critical views and displayed an “apparent bemusement 
at the rapid policy shift in Germany” (Elliot, 2013, p. 45). The difference in public acceptance 
of nuclear power generation between the UK and Germany may thus not only be the result of 
differing historical acceptance, but also of “a greater intensity of reporting of the Fukushima 
accident in Germany” (Poortinga et al., 2013, p. 29). This suggests that the media played a 
crucial role in shaping public opinion on nuclear power. 
Four months after the Fukushima disaster, on 30 June 2011, The Guardian published an article 
in which it exposed an e-mail exchange between pro-nuclear actors. The article was based on 
The Guardian’s Freedom of Information request relating to e-mails focusing on the Fukushima 
disaster by civil servants and politicians associated with the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (DBIS) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The 
article did not result in widespread and sustained media coverage and was only picked up by 
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The Telegraph.3 We discuss the e-mail exchange and the pro-nuclear actors involved in more 
detail in Section 4. 1.
4. Data and Research method
4.1 Data
The data consists of 55 private e-mails exchanged by pro-nuclear corporate and political actors 
in the six weeks following the Fukushima disaster and 32 public documents, including 15 press 
releases by nuclear energy companies operating in the UK, 14 documents issued by political 
actors, and three documents issued by regulatory actors between March and June 2011. Four 
companies were involved in the e-mail exchange, namely the two nuclear power operators in 
the UK, EDF Energy (EDF hereafter) and Horizon, and two firms specialising in the design, 
construction and servicing of new nuclear power reactors, namely French-based Areva and US-
based Westinghouse. Both were involved in negotiations with the government to build new 
reactors in the UK at the time of the Fukushima disaster. EDF is the only publicly listed utility 
company in the UK an  operates eight nuclear power plants. These were originally owned by 
British Energy, which was bought by the French utility EDF S.A. in 2009. Horizon Nuclear 
Power operates two nuclear power plants in the UK. It started out as a joint venture between 
E.On UK and RWE npower, which was still the case at the time of the Fukushima disaster. The 
company is currently owned by the Japanese multinational Hitachi. Table 2 lists the key pro-
nuclear actors involved in the private and public communication following the Fukushima 
disaster. 
[Table 2 about here]
Private e-mails
The e-mails were downloaded from The Guardian website (The Guardian, 2011). Table 3 lists 
the number of e-mails sent by groups of pro-nuclear actors by date. They include e-mails by 
political actors (OND/DEEC, DBIS), corporate actors (EDF, Horizon, Westinghouse, Nuclear 
Industry Association (NIA)), and academics (Sheffield University). Sixty-nine percent of e-
mails were exchanged in the week immediately after the Fukushima disaster (38 e-mails out of 
55). This indicates the perceived urgency of agreeing on a joint public communication strategy 
to safeguard their common interests in the continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK. 
Corporate and political actors were by far the most active in the private e-mail exchange (42 
percent corporate actors, 53 percent political actors, five percent academics). The volume and 
frequency of e-mails exchanged over the six-week period of observation indicates the strategic 
importance pro-nuclear corporate and political actors attributed to public communication on 
the impact of Fukushima on UK nuclear power generation. 
[Table 3 about here]
Public documents
Public documents included in the analysis comprise corporate, political, and regulatory 
documents. We analyse the press releases of two UK nuclear power plant operators, namely 
EDF and Horizon, both of which were involved in the private e-mail exchange. Press releases 
are an important means of communication, which allow firms to respond to legitimacy threats 
and to engage in public debates on current issues and events in a timely manner (Aerts and 
Cormier, 2009). They were collected from the news section of the company websites for a 
3 It also did not result in public criticism by the opposition party (Labour), protests by anti-nuclear groups, or 
discussion in Parliament.
Page 11 of 48 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal12
three-month period following the disaster. Press releases selected for analysis refer to the 
Fukushima disaster and/or nuclear power generation in the UK (eleven EDF press releases and 
four Horizon press releases). Government websites and websites of regulatory bodies were 
searched to collect relevant public communication by political and regulatory actors. The 
documents comprise letters exchanged between politicians, civil servants, and regulators, 
transcripts of speeches and statements, as well as news releases from the government ministries 
and regulatory bodies. Mike Weightman’s foreword in his interim report was also included in 
the analysis, as this document concludes the political debate on the future of nuclear power in 
the UK, as well as a thank-you letter from Chris Huhne to Mike Weightman on 17 June 2011 
for compiling the report. In total, the data comprises fifteen corporate documents, fourteen 
political documents and three regulatory documents (see Appendix 1 for an overview of public 
documents). 
4.2 Method of analysis
Drawing on the prior empirical literature, we identify pre-existing discursive frames on nuclear 
energy and on crisis response and resolution and examine whether and how these frames occur 
in the data by paying particular attention to figurative language, including catch-phrases, 
similes, metaphors, and analogies (Cornellisen et al., 2011; Cornellisen and Werner, 2014; 
Waller and Conaway, 2011). We trace the discursive frames from their inception in private e-
mails to their reproduction in public communication and in the media by establishing 
intertextual links. This allows us to make inferences on the extent to which pro-nuclear actors 
used language strategically to ensure continued public support for nuclear power generation in 
the UK. We also check for evidence of counter-frames by examining UK newspaper articles 
and a Greenpeace report (2012).
Intertextuality
Intertextuality refers to “texts draw[ing] upon, incorporat[ing], recontextualiz[ing] and 
dialogu[ing] with other texts” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 17, emphasis in original) and manifests 
itself in words and phrases in a particular text that emanate from other texts. Intertextuality 
may be explicit when texts explicitly quote or paraphrase words and phrases from other texts, 
or implicit, when texts indirectly invoke other texts, for example by paraphrasing (Brennan et 
al., 2013). For example, in our data the phrase ‘knee-jerk reactions’ is often paraphrased as 
‘rushing to judgement’. 
The concept of intertextuality has been employed in accounting research to trace interactions 
between multinational companies and an NGO (Brennan et al., 2013) and between a newly 
privatised company and the media (Lupu and Sandu, 2017). Brennan et al. (2013) examine 
how companies in the apparel industry and a powerful stakeholder engage in a dialogue during 
a public controversy by explicitly or implicitly reproducing key phrases from each others’ press 
releases. Lupu and Sandu (2017) analyse how a newly privatise company in a transitional 
economy evokes dominant discourses propagated by the media to construct a sense of 
legitimacy. Thus, intertextuality provides linguistic evidence of the strategic use of language 
as a means of promoting agendas and achieving economic, social, and political goals.
Pre-existing frames 
We focus on the (re)production of frames on nuclear energy and the Fukushima disaster by 
pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors to legitimate the continuation of the 
commercial use of nuclear energy in the UK. However, as nuclear energy is a contentious iss e, 
we also examine whether and how pro-nuclear frames were opposed. For this purpose, we draw 
on the prior empirical literature on frames on crisis response and resolution and on nuclear 
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energy. Although not explicitly conceptualised as such, the crisis communication and policy 
literature have identified a number of frames on crisis response and resolution, including 
avoiding knee-jerk reactions, lessons learned, and wake-up call (Ashlock et al., 2006; 
Abolafia, 2004; Mitchell, 2006). There are two possibilities of framing a negative event, such 
as a disaster, depending on the argument or solution put forward, namely either obfuscating its 
negative aspects as a means of advocating a continuation of the status quo or emphasising its 
negative aspects in order to encourage change. Avoiding knee-jerk reactions is commonly used 
by social actors and the media to discuss crises adversely affecting public health or economic 
well-being to caution against an impulsive emotional response (Ashlock et al., 2006; Abolafia, 
2004). It suggests that change would be the result of an emotional overreaction to the crisis. 
Lessons learned serves to resolve a crisis by drawing a line underneath it and re-evaluating it 
as a positive learning experience. Interestingly, it was employed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer to the Chernobyl disaster in the context of its 25th anniversary 
on 3 March 2011, i.e., just eight days before the Fukushima disaster. By contrast, wake-up call 
highlights negative aspects of the crisis or disaster as a means of advocating policy change 
(Mitchell, 2006). 
Analysing US and UK newspaper coverage on nuclear energy from 1945 to the Chernobyl 
disaster in 1986 (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989) and from 2005 to 2008 (Doyle, 2011), the 
media sociology and media studies literature has identified three pro-nuclear frames (progress, 
energy independence, and climate change) and five anti-nuclear frames (devil’s bargain, 
runaway, not cost effective, public accountability, and soft paths). Over this 60-year period, 
specific frames featured more or less prominently, depending on socio-political and economic 
events. Pro-nuclear frames highlight positive aspects of nuclear energy, whereas anti-nuclear 
frames emphasise negative aspects of nuclear energy. Progress denotes the contribution of 
nuclear power to economic and technological development and growth (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989). Energy independence refers to the use of nuclear power as a strategy to 
achieve independence from energy imports (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). It goes hand in 
hand with the idea of ‘energy security’, which entails a country’s ability to generate sufficient 
energy to meet demand. Climate change proposes nuclear energy as a solution for tackling 
global warming, due to its low-carbon characteristic (Doyle, 2011). From the 1990s onwards, 
the three pro-nuclear frames have often been blended together in an overarching frame referred 
to as nuclear renaissance in order to legitimate and justify the expansion of nuclear power 
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 2009; Butler et al., 2011; Doyle, 
2011). Nuclear renaissance was the dominant frame on nuclear power in the UK at the time of 
the Fukushima disaster. It was promulgated by the New Labour government with the 
publication of White Papers on nuclear energy in 2007 and 2008 and widely disseminated by 
the UK media (Doyle, 2011). Plans to build new nuclear power plants were justified by the 
claim that nuclear energy was in the interest of the British public, as it could reduce carbon 
emission and secure future energy supplies (Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 2009). The anti-nuclear 
frame that has a bearing on our study is not cost effective. It portrays nuclear energy as more 
expensive than alternative energy sources, once construction, running, and decommissioning 
costs have been taken into consideration.
5. Intertextuality and discursive framing in private and public communication
Drawing on Fleming and Spicer’s (2014) concpetualisation of power as manipulation and as 
domination, this section presents the findings of our analysis of e-mails and public documents 
by pro-nuclear actors following the Fukushima disaster. We first discuss how corporate, 
political, and regulatory actors tapped into an existing pro-nuclear social network in a private 
space for agenda setting purposes to agree a joint public communication strategy 
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(manipulation). We then outline how pro-nuclear actors discursively framed the Fukushima 
disaster and nuclear power in their public communication in order to influence public 
perceptions to ensure public support for the continuation of nuclear energy generation in the 
UK (domination).
5.1 Agenda-setting
The publication of private e-mails relating to the Fukushima disaster by The Guardian rendered 
a previously invisible exercise of power as manipulation visible.4 In the article accompanying 
the publication of the private e-mail exchange The Guardian criticises the lack of transparency 
and consultation in public policy decision-making by the nuclear industry and government, 
who are viewed as furthering their own private agendas, rather than the interests of the UK 
public. The Guardian accuses them of “draw[ing] up a co-ordinated public relations strategy 
to play down the Fukushima nuclear accident […] to try to ensure the accident did not derail 
their plans for a new generation of nuclear stations in the UK” (Edwards, 2011). The article 
also quotes a Greenpeace spokesperson calling the e-mail exchange “scandalous collusion” 
which “highlights the government’s blind obsession with nuclear power”, concluding that 
neither the government nor the nuclear industry “can be trusted when it comes to nuclear” 
(Edwards, 2011). The private e-mail exchange indicates that corporate, political, and regulatory 
actors engaged in agenda setting by tapping into an existing pro-nuclear social network to agree 
a joint public communication strategy aimed at preventing a public controversy on nuclear 
energy. The use of the theatrical metaphors of ‘lines’ and ‘script’ suggests that pro-nuclear 
actors viewed public communication on the Fukushima disaster as a performance to an 
audience of civil society actors. 
The private e-mail exchange was initiated by Mark Higson two days after the Fukushima 
disaster, on Sunday, 13 March 2011. In his role as the Chief Executive of the Office for Nuclear 
Development (OND) he was responsible for removing potential barriers to investment in 
nuclear energy. The purpose of his first e-mail was to obtain agreement on official government 
‘lines’ on the Fukushima disaster. He stated that “if pressed” Chris Huhne might “wish to say 
he is asking Mike Weightman to provide a full assessment of the implications and lessons to be 
learnt” (Higson, E1, 13 March 2011). He further noted that “it would be good if EdF could 
welcome [the full assessment of the implications and lessons to be learnt by Mike Weightman]” 
(ibid.). Only an hour later a DBIS civil servant replied to Mark Higson’s e-mail, stating that it 
was “[g]ood to see [Higson] on Friday” and agreeing that the “[e]vents in Japan have the 
potential to set the nuclear industry back if [they] do no counter quickly and accurately” (DBIS 
civil servant, E2, 13 March 2011). Using military metaphors, he5 compared the threat of a 
public controversy on the continutation of nuclear power in the UK to a battle between pro-
nuclear and anti-nuclear actors, stating that “HMG and the NIA should coordinate lines” in 
order “to own the ground on this and not allow the anti-nuclear people to take up occupancy 
of it” (ibid.). He emphasised that pro-nuclear actors “need to ensure [they] have strong 
messages on it and that [they] are coordinated with the industry and Whitehall” (DBIS civil 
servant, E3, 13 March 2011). He added that “[f]rom web searches [he] can see anti-nuclear 
people across Europe have wasted no time of blurring this all into Chernobyl and the works” 
and that they “need to quash any stories trying to compare this to Chernobyl – by using the 
facts to discredit” (DBIS official, E4, 13 March 2011). This suggests that he not only intended 
to marginalise anti-nuclear actors, but also to discredit and delegitimate them in order to 
4 The exposure of the covert e-mail exchange did not result in widespread and sustained media coverage. It was 
only picked up by one UK newspaper, namely The Telegraph. It also did not result in public criticism by the 
opposition party (Labour), protests by anti-nuclear groups, or discussion in Parliament.
5 We cannot be sure of the civil servant’s gender, but take an educated guess based on the language used.
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exclude their interests and voices from the public debate, thus shrinking the civic space. He 
also called on other actors in the pro-nuclear network to share their ‘lines’:
“If you have lines / messaging work through … and … and they can get these into the 
HMG messaging as well as briefs to Ministers. OND can also work on communication 
to the local communities where new build is proposed in the UK. We need to all be 
working from the same material to get the message through to the media and the public 
– including the NIA.” (DBIS civil servant, E5, 13 March 2011)
This suggests that the DBIS civil servant strategically and consciously implements a pubic 
communication strategy by pro-nuclear actors to ensure media coverage in line with their 
interests.
Westinghouse was the first corporate actor to reply to the e-mails sent by political actors, 
emphasising that they would use government ‘lines’ only “in reactive mode” and otherwise 
“defer any media requests to industry bodies”, such as the NIA, as Westinghouse does not 
“want [their] company name drawn into this” (Westinghouse, E6, 13 March 2011). EDF shared 
their public statements to local communities at nuclear sites with other pro-nuclear actors in 
the network via e-mail on 14 March 2011. The same ‘lines’ were published by EDF as a press 
release the following day. Throughout the private e-mail exchange pro-nuclear actors kept each 
other updated on their public ‘lines’ to ensure coordinated messaging to the public and the 
media. They also kept each other informed on media reports on the Fukushima disaster. Pro-
nuclear actors also referred to a Nuclear Development Forum, scheduled to take place on 
Thursday, 17 March 2011, noting that the event would be an opportunity to discuss their public 
communication strategy in person. 
5.2 Discursive framing
We identify four discursive frames on the Fukushima disaster and on nuclear power in the 
private and public communication by pro-nuclear actors. They originate in the e-mail exchange 
and were deliberately and consciously reproduced in public communication and subsequently 
disseminated by the media. These include (1) avoiding knee-jerk reactions, (2) lessons learned, 
(3) safety, and (4) nuclear renaissance. They constitute pre-existing frames on nuclear power 
and on crisis response and resolution, which are strategically reinterpreted and recombined to 
influence public opinion on nuclear power. Avoiding knee-jerk reactions and lessons learned 
obfuscate negative aspects of the Fukushima disaster, whereas safety and nuclear renaissance 
highlight positive aspects of nuclear energy. In combination, they serve to legitimate the 
continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK and to silence alternative voices. Appendix 
2 provides examles of the four discursive frames from both private and public communication, 
thus illustrating intertextual links. A more detailed discussion is provided below, which 
considers the frames by pro-nuclear actors in the context of emerging counter-frames 
articulated by The Guardian and Greenpeace. Figure 1 summarises our findings in schematic 
form by setting the four dominant pro-nuclear frames against anti-nuclear counter-frames.
Frames on the Fukushima disaster
Pro-nuclear actors aimed to obfuscate negative aspects of the Fukushima disaster in order to 
advocate and legitimate the continuation of nuclear power. For this purpose, they employed 
two pre-existing frames, namely avoiding knee-jerk reactions and lessons learned. Avoiding 
knee-jerk reactions is aimed at averting anti-nuclear sentiment in the UK in the aftermath of 
the Fukushima disaster by portraying such responses in a negative light. The phrase ‘avoiding 
knee-jerk reactions’ is used interchangeably with ‘avoiding snap judgements’ to denote a hasty 
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emotional response based on an overestimation of the risks and danger inherent in nuclear 
power generation. It establishes an implicit link to the dominant pro-nuclear safety frame 
discussed below and stands in opposition to the anti-nuclear dangerous frame, which was 
gaining ground in Germany. Avoiding knee-jerk reactions originates in the very first e-mail 
sent by Mark Higson warning that “[w]e shouldn’t make snap judgements at this point” 
(Higson, E1, 13 March 2011, emphasis added). Indirectly quoting the nuclear industry, the 
media reproduces the frame, as evidenced by a newspaper article on the Fukushima disaster in 
The Telegraph on 15 March 2011:
“The nuclear industry has expressed alarm about a possible "knee jerk" response to a 
disaster that was caused by an earthquake and tsunami sequence, the likes of which has 
never happened in European recorded history” (Waterfield, 2011, emphasis added).
The article states the concern of pro-nuclear actors regarding emotional responses to the 
Fukushima disaster. This concern was triggered by the strong anti-nuclear sentiments to the 
disaster in Germany resulting in the eventual phase-out of nuclear power. Avoiding knee-jerk 
reactions can thus be seen as an attempt by UK pro-nuclear actors to reinforce the dominant 
safety frame and pre-empt the traction of the anti-nuclear dangerous frame, thus preventing the 
rise of anti-nuclear sentiments in the UK.
Avoiding knee-jerk reactions was reproduced extensively in both corporate and political public 
documents and in the UK media. EDF’s CEO Vincent de Rivaz praised the leadership by UK 
politicians with respect to their handling of the Fukushima disaster. He noted that “[a]ll have 
shown clear-headedness in their response – avoiding knee-jerk reactions” (EDF CD3, 17 
March 2011, emphasis added). Vincent de Rivaz contrasts ‘clear-headedness’ with ‘knee-jerk 
reaction’, thus presenting the two responses as a dichotomy of rationality versus emotion. His 
negative evaluation of actions driven by emotions is in line with the cultural dominance of 
rationality in Western society and thus resonates with audiences’ values. On 17 March 2011, 
Chris Huhne was quoted in a press release by the DECC saying:
“We should not rush to judgment. It is important that we have the full facts at our 
disposal. I have asked the Chief Nuclear Inspector for a full report so that the 
implications for the UK are clear” (PD5, 17 March 2011, emphasis added). 
Phrases associated with the frame also occur in other policy documents, emphasising the value 
and importance of “full facts and their implications” (PD2, 14 March 2011) and stressing that 
any assessment must be “based on firm evidence” (PD11, 18 May 2011), thus clearly valuing 
rational and fully-informed decision-making. The frame avoiding knee-jerk reactions was also 
reproduced by The Times, particularly in the context of depicting Germany’s response to the 
Fukushima disaster. They referred to “Germany's kneejerk decision to slow extensions to the 
lives of its fleet of nuclear power plants” (The Times, 2011b, emphasis added), thus portraying 
the reaction of the German government in a negative light. However, it is worth noting that The 
Times is supportive of the Conservative Party and are therefore inclined to reproduce the pro-
nuclear frames pushed by the coalition government at the time. Interestingly, no counter-frame 
emerged and avoiding knee-jerk reactions remained unopposed. In Figure 1 we indicate wake-
up call as a potential alternative frame as a means of questioning the legitimacy of nuclear 
energy after the Fukushima disaster.
Lessons learned is a pre-existing frame used by social actors to draw a line under a crisis and 
move forward. It had already been employed in the context of the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
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(Reynolds and Seeger, 2005; Seeger, 2006). On 3 March 2011, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) released a news item on their website announcing a conference to be held in 
Kiev on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster on 26 April 2011:
“To commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the IAEA, 
which has monitored radioactivity in the region and worked to reduce exposure to it since 
the accident, will participate in an international conference designed to ensure that the 
lessons learned from the accident will bring about lasting improvements in nuclear and 
radiation safety globally.” (IAEA, 2011a, emphasis added).
UK politicians, and especially regulators, who interacted with the IAEA on a regular basis, 
thus had access to the frame. For example, Mark Higson stated in the first e-mail on 13 March 
2011 that they “will be working closely with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
and Japan to carefully establish what lessons can be learned.” (E1, 13 March 2011, emphasis 
added). What is more, Mike Weightman was appointed by the IAEA as the independent 
regulator to lead the IAEA’s “International Fact Finding Mission” (IAEA, 2011b), which he 
asserted would “help inform [his] final and more comprehensive lessons learned report which 
[he would] publish in September” (RD3, 18 May 2011). It is therefore highly likely that UK 
pro-nuclear actors deliberately drew on the frame lessons learned in their public 
communication in an attempt to influence the way the UK public interpreted the Fukushima 
disaster, namely by obfuscating negative aspects of the disaster and by portraying it as an 
opportunity to improve current and future nuclear safety in the UK. 
In fact, the frame originated in the first e-mail sent by Mark Higson in which he stated that 
Chris Huhne would be interviewed by the media that day. Quoting an earlier statement by Chris 
Huhne in relation to the Fukushima disaster, Mark Higson said that Chris Huhne “may stick 
with current lines”: 
“The incident at Fukushima is clearly a very serious matter. It is much too early to say 
what the impact and implications are. We will be working closely with the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) and Japan to carefully establish what lessons can 
be learned.” (Huhne quoted in E1, 13 March 2011, emphasis added).
In corporate and political public communication lessons learned is often reproduced in 
conjunction with the term ‘implications’ as a means of suggesting a positive way forward after 
the disaster. The term ‘implications’ also featured prominently in the title of Mike 
Weightman’s interim report published on 18 May 2011: “Japanese earthquake and tsunami: 
Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry” (ONR, 2011, emphasis added). 
EDF and Horizon also extensively reproduced the frame lessons learned in their public 
communication in various modifications over time. For example, EDF stated in their second 
press release:
“On nuclear, we welcome the fact that the UK Government has asked the safety regulator 
to report on the implications of the events in Japan. EDF Energy is happy to support this 
work in whatever way it can to ensure lessons are learned. The nuclear industry puts 
great weight on learning from any such events.” (EDF CD2, 15 March 2011, emphasis 
added).
Horizon’s first press release stated: 
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“we welcome the announcement by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Chris Huhne, that the Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr Mike Weightman, will 
prepare a report on the implications and lessons learned from the situation in Japan.” 
(Horizon CD1, 17 March 2011, emphasis added). 
What is more, both nuclear power operators repeatedly asserted their determination and 
commitment “to learn all the lessons from this event in Japan” (EDF CD5, 5 April 2011, 
emphasis added). EDF’s CEO Vincent de Rivaz even referred to the events following the 
Fukushima disaster as a “lessons learnt exercise” (EDF CD3, 17 March 2011). The frame was 
also reproduced by politicians, such as, for example, by then Prime Minister David Cameron 
in a speech on 14 March 2011: 
“Mr Speaker, the Energy Secretary [Chris Huhne] has asked Chief Nuclear Inspector, 
Dr. Mike Weightman, for a thorough report on the implications of the situation in Japan. 
The UK does not have reactors of the design of those in Fukushima and nor does it plan 
any. Nor are we in a seismically sensitive zone. But if there are lessons to learn, then we 
will learn them.” (PD3, 14 March 2011, emphasis added).
In fact, David Cameron continued to use phrases relating to the frame lessons learned 
throughout the political debate on Fukushima, thereby tapping into and reinforcing pro-nuclear 
sentiment. 
Lessons learned was also extensively reproduced by the media. For example, on 14 March 
2011, The Times science editor Mark Henderson stated that “Chris Huhne, the Energy 
Secretary, has asked the chief nuclear Inspector to examine its implications” (The Times, 
2011a, emphasis added). The Daily Mail featured an article on 15 March 2011 explaining that 
“Energy minister Chris Huhne has begun a review of Britain’s nuclear programme to assess 
lessons to be learned from Japan” (Daily Mail, 2011, emphasis added). This demonstrates that 
pro-nuclear actors succeeded in disseminating pro-nuclear discursive frames on the Fukushima 
disaster via the media. Interestingly, the frame was also picked up by anti-nuclear groups who 
turned it on its head by questioning whether any lessons had been learned. On 24 June 2011, 
the Independent quoted Louise Hutchins, a climate and energy campaigner for Greenpeace, 
saying: 
“It's illogical, and possibly illegal, for the Government to keep pushing for a fleet of new 
nuclear reactors before we've even learned the lessons from the Fukushima meltdown. 
Countries around the world are dropping their nuclear programmes as costs soar” 
(Morris, 2011). 
 
This indicates that the frame was appropriated by anti-nuclear social actors to make a case 
against nuclear power. 
In summary, the frames avoiding knee-jerk reactions and lessons learned obfuscate the 
negative aspects of the Fukushima disaster and are linked to the pro-nuclear frames safety 
discussed below. Avoiding knee-jerk reactions asks audiences to refrain from an emotional 
response to the Fukushima disaster based on an overestimation of risk inherent in nuclear 
energy and thus an underestimation of its safety. Lessons learned constructs the Fukushima 
disaster as an opportunity to improve nuclear safety.
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Frames on nuclear energy
Following the Fukushima disaster, pro-nuclear actors in the UK employed two pro-nuclear 
frames, namely safety and nuclear renaissance. The safety frame emphasises a crucial aspect 
of nuclear energy on which the acceptance of its commercial use depends. Reinforcing this 
dominant pre-existing frame was a key aspect of the communication strategy adopted by social 
actors to prevent the traction of the anti-nuclear counter-frame of nuclear energy as dangerous. 
This was particularly crucial in light of the anti-nuclear sentiments in Germany, Belgium and 
Switzerland. The safety frame originated in the private e-mail exchange and was repeatedly 
reproduced by corporate and political actors in their public communication. What is more, a 
DBIS civil servant explicitly asked e-mail recipients to emphasise the safety of UK nuclear 
installations in their communication with the public and the media. He stressed the need “to 
get positive messaging … that nuclear is safe” (E2, 13 March 2011, emphasis added) and “to 
show the safety of nuclear” (E4, 13 March 2011, emphasis added). Corporate actors heeded this 
request. EDF’s first press release highlighted the safety of their nuclear power plants:
“[a]ll EDF Energy’s nuclear power stations are protected against the effects of seismic 
events. These measures are detailed in approved safety cases which are agreed with the 
regulator and cover all credible seismic events in the UK” (EDF CD1, 14 March 2011, 
emphasis added). 
Horizon also emphasised the safety of their operations in their first press release:
“UK nuclear installations are built with a wealth of safety measures in place to ensure 
that they can withstand a range of natural disasters and avoid causing harm to the public 
or to the environment” (Horizon CD1, 17 March 2011, emphasis added). 
The safety frame is epitomised by the phrase ‘safety is our top priority’. In our dataset, the 
phrase was first used in the public letter by Chris Huhne on 14 March 2011 requesting Mike 
Weightman to prepare a report on the implications of the Fukushima disaster on the UK nuclear 
industry. Chris Huhne stated:
“it is essential that we understand the full facts and implications, both for existing nuclear 
installations and any new reactor programme, as safety is always my number one 
priority” (PD1, 14 March 2011, emphasis added). 
The phrase was picked up and reproduced by EDF in their public communication the following 
day, when they stated their intention to “continue to ensure that safety is [their] top priority” 
(EDF CD2, 15 March 2011, emphasis added). During the time period of observation, the phrase 
was repeatedly used by pro-nuclear corporate and political actors in their public 
communication. A press release by the DECC quoted Chris Huhne stating that “[s]afety is and 
will continue to be the number one priority for existing nuclear sites and for any new power 
stations” (PD6, 17 March 2011, emphasis added). EDF emphasised that “[s]afety remains the 
priority at [their] existing plants and in [their] new build plans” (EDF CD8, 9 May 2011, 
emphasis added). Political and corporate actors related the safety frame to both existing nuclear 
power plants and to planned new builds, as a means of safeguarding prior investments. The 
safety frame was also reproduced in the Weightman report and in responses by the UK nuclear 
industry to its publication. Horizon’s Chief Operating Officer Alan Raymant is quoted stating 
that “[s]afety will always be our number one priority” (Horizon CD4, 16 June 2011). EDF’s 
response to the report contained several quotes from the report itself, including, for example:
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“EDF Energy welcomed the interim conclusions that the UK nuclear power industry has 
reacted “responsibly and appropriately” to the Events in Japan, “displaying a 
leadership for safety and a strong safety culture”” (EDF CD10, 16 May 2011, emphasis 
added).
Similarly, Horizon referred to the Weightman report in a press release by noting the author’s 
“recognition of the strong safety culture in the UK nuclear industry” (Horizon CD2, 18 May 
2011, emphasis added). The safety frame is a crucial aspect of pro-nuclear actors’ 
communication strategy, as it highlights a potentially contested aspect of nuclear energy, with 
the aim of reassuring the public of the safety of nuclear power to ensure their continued support 
and to maintain the legitimacy of the nuclear industry in the UK.
Nuclear renaissance frame constitutes a secondary pro-nuclear frame, which is used in 
conjunction with the safety frame to reinforce dominant pre-existing frames on nuclear energy. 
Blending three pro-nuclear frames, namely progress, energy independence, and climate 
change, it is crucial for the government to safeguard its twin interests of meeting climate change 
targets and ensuring a sustainable energy supply for the future (Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 
2009). At the time of the Fukushima disaster, nuclear renaissance was the dominant frame on 
nuclear power in the UK. Following the disaster, political and corporate actors continued to 
draw on the nuclear renaissance frame in their public communication to maintain the status 
quo of nuclear energy. For example, Chris Huhne noted in a speech that the UK’s “challenge 
is to come up with an energy policy that delivers safe, secure and low-carbon energy to 2050 
and beyond” (PD8, 22 March 2011, emphasis added). Although he did not explicitly refer to 
nuclear power as the source of such energy, it is implied in the discursive framing. EDF also 
reproduced the nuclear renaissance frame in its public communication. Only six days after the 
earthquake and tsunami, EDF’s CEO Vincent de Rivaz spoke at the Nuclear Development 
Forum stating that “[t]he critical task in front of us today is to deliver a secure, clean and 
affordable energy mix” (EDF CD3, 17 March 2011, emphasis added). In response to the events 
still unfolding in Japan, he reproduced the frame to justify the expansion of nuclear energy 
generation. He also highlighted that “[t]he events in Japan do not change the need for nuclear 
in Britain” (ibid.). What is more, a reoccurring paragraph at the end of EDF’s press releases 
stated:
“EDF Energy’s safe and secure operation of its eight existing nuclear power stations at 
sites across the country makes it the UK’s largest generator of low carbon electricity. 
EDF Energy is also leading the UK's nuclear renaissance and has published plans to 
build four new nuclear plants, subject to the right investment framework. These new 
plants could generate enough low carbon electricity for about 40% of Britain’s homes. 
They would make an important contribution to the UK’s future needs for clean, secure 
and affordable energy. The project is already creating business and job opportunities for 
British companies and workers.” (EDF CD6, 11 April 2011, emphasis added).
This quote epitomises the nuclear renaissance frame by emphasising that nuclear energy helps 
secure low-carbon energy supplies at low cost. EDF also explicitly used the term ‘nuclear 
renaissance’ in its press releases. Tapping into the positive global sentiment regarding nuclear 
power, EDF pushed for the expansion of nuclear energy, including nuclear new builds in the 
UK. 
The safety and the nuclear renaissance frame, with its sub-frames of progress, energy 
independence, and climate change stand in opposition to alternative anti-nuclear frames 
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circulating through society, including dangerous, dirty, and not cost effective, which emphasise 
negative aspects of nuclear power. The publication of a Greenpeace report in February 2012 
also made no waves in the UK. Entitled ‘Nuclear power: dirty, dangerous and expensive’ 
(Greenpeace, 2012), it presented counter-frames to the safety and nuclear renaissance frames 
by confronting the view of nuclear energy as “secure, clean and affordable” (EDF CD3, 17 
March 2011). However, alternative anti-nuclear frames did not gain any traction. We can 
therefore infer that the framing strategy by pro-nuclear actors was successful in preventing the 
dissemination of anti-nuclear frames, thus asserting the dominance of pro-nuclear sentiment 
and reinforcing the status quo.
In combination, the four pro-nuclear discursive frames constituted orchestrated messaging by 
corporate, political, and regulatory actors as a response to the Fukushima disaster with the 
purpose of reassuring the public of the safety of UK nuclear power plants in the UK, thus 
maintaining the public acceptance of nuclear energy and the legitimacy of the UK nuclear 
industry. The frames avoiding knee-jerk reaction, lessons learned, and safety were used as 
precursors to lay the ground for the nuclear renaissance frame, which implies that nuclear 
energy provides energy security and combats climate change, whilst keeping energy prices 
low. It thus served to defend the status quo by portraying nuclear power as a safe and 
indispensable energy source for the UK. Figure 1 illustrates how the four pro-nuclear frames, 
in combination, guided audiences’ evaluation of the consequences of the Fukushima disaster 
for the UK in favour of continuing nuclear power generation. They facilitated positive, 
forward-looking messages on nuclear energy by reinforcing pre-existing dominant frames on 
crisis response and resolution and on nuclear energy, thus preventing alternative anti-nuclear 
frames from gaining traction. 
[Figure 1 about here]
The framing strategy appears to have been successful, as the public reaction to the Fukushima 
disaster in the UK was rather ‘muted’ in comparison with other European countries (Elliot, 
2013, p. 4). This allowed pro-nuclear actors to secure public support for nuclear new builds in 
the UK. What is more, survey evidence suggests, in contrast to other European countries, such 
as Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, public acceptance of nuclear power seems to have 
increased in the UK after the Fukushima disaster (Poortinga et al., 2013). Public opinion polls 
show that between 2005 and 2013 support for nuclear power generation in the UK increased 
(from 26 to 32 percent), while public concern about nuclear power decreased (from 58 to 47 
percent). Similarly, the perceived risk of nuclear power generation decreased from 73 percent 
in 2005 to 55 percent in 2013. The most recent UK survey in 2013 shows that more respondents 
supported (42 percent) than opposed (32 percent) nuclear new builds. The surveys also indicate 
that the UK public was willing to accept new builds, especially in the context of combatting 
climate change and securing future energy supplies. 
5.3 Discussion
The private e-mail exchange provides evidence that pro-nuclear corporate, political, and 
regulatory actors accessed existing social networks for agenda setting purposes to influence 
public policy in their favour. Similar to lobbying and political party contributions (Cho et al., 
2006; Cho et al., 2018), tapping into social networks for policy agenda setting purposes 
constitutes a direct, but less visible form of corporate power as manipulation (Fleming and 
Spicer, 2014). In contrast to lobbying and political party contributions, which entail corporate 
actors attempting to influence the work of legislators so that policy agendas are in line with 
business interests, networking between corporate and political actors entails pursuing common 
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goals to serve the vested interests of both parties. Specifically, pro-nuclear corporate, political, 
and regulatory actors cooperated interacted via e-mail to agree a joint public communication 
strategy with the purpose of providing consistent pro-nuclear messaging to the UK public and 
the media and marginalising anti-nuclear voices. For this purpose, they aligned their public 
communication by drawing on and contributing to dominant discursive frames on nuclear 
energy and crisis communication and resolution. Mobilising discursive resources to attain a 
common goal, while curbing the articulation of other interests and voices constitutes power as 
domination (Fleming and Spicer, 2014, p. 260).
We provide evidence that pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors cooperated to 
use public communication strategically to influence public opinion on a matter of public 
interest in order to serve their own sectional interests and to suppress social conflict (Michelon 
et al., 2016). They actively sought to shape public opinion on nuclear power to avoid public 
consultation because the status quo served the combined interests of the government and the 
nuclear industry, who had already committed resources to nuclear new-builds. This indicates 
that the UK government cooperated with the nuclear industry to safeguard common interests 
without considering public interest. Put differently, the UK government presumed that it was 
in the best interests of the UK public to continue with the commercial use of nuclear energy 
after the Fukushima disaster without prior public consultation. This is inherently problematic 
as political actors purpusefully excluded alternative voices from the public debate, thereby 
violating democratic principles. They deliberately curtailed the civic space in order to prevent 
a public controversy from arising, thus restricting citizen participation in decision-making on 
matters of public interest. This, in turn, undermines democracy, which is based on public policy 
being the outcome of public debate, rather than decision making in a private space (Malena, 
2015). 
What is more, our findings suggest the existence of a powerful ‘state-business nexus’ (Siddiqui 
and Uddin, 2016, p. 679) which sought to protect the commercial use of nuclear energy in the 
UK. We thus confirm Siddiqui and Uddin’s (2016) and Archel et al.’s (2009) findings that the 
State is not a neutral arbiter, but an interested party who may support business interests, if it is 
in its own interest. This ‘blurring of the political and economic sphere’ (Scherer et al., 2014) 
is particularly problematic with respect to the provision f public goods, such as energy or 
transport, due to the lack of consultation and accountability on a matter of public interest. 
Accountability is essential when decisions, actions, and outcomes impact on civil society and 
entails transparency in the decision-making process so that it ca  be determined whether and 
how public interest is served by actions and their outcomes (ICAEW, 2012). 
6. Summary and Conclusion
Drawing on political economy theory and the concept of power as manipulation and as 
domination, we examined how pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors covertly 
stifled legitimate political expression by preventing a public controversy from arising in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. For this purpose, we analysed the private and public 
communication of pro-nuclear actors following the Fukushima disaster. We found that social 
actors mobilised power by tapping into existing pro-nuclear social networks in order to 
cooperate behind the scenes to influence public opinion and public policy on nuclear power. 
They arranged consistent, pro-nuclear public messaging as a means of influencing energy 
policy outcomes in their favour, rather than to serve public interest. For this purpose, they drew 
on pre-existing dominant frames on nuclear power and crisis response and resolution in order 
to prevent alternative frames from becoming prominent. These included (1) avoiding knee-jerk 
reactions, (2) lessons learned, (3) safety, and (4) nuclear renaissance. Drawing on the concept 
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of intertextuality, we traced these frames from their inception in private communication to their 
reproduction in public communication and their dissemination via the media. In combination, 
they guided audiences’ evaluation of the consequences of the Fukushima disaster for the UK 
in favour of continuing nuclear power generation. 
Our findings provide evidence of the State not necessarily being a neutral arbiter, but an 
interested party. The State strategically cooperated with corporations to achieve a common goal 
(Archel et al., 2009), which may not necessarily be in the public interest. Public interest is 
based on the consideration of “the welfare of the representative individual … in the decision-
making process” (ICAEW, 2012), which, in turn, rests on transparency in the decision-making 
process. Thus, decisions on contentious issues, such as nuclear power generation, need to be 
made openly and democratically so that they represent the interests and will of the UK public. 
By marginalising alternative voices in order to stifle open public debate over an issue of public 
interest, the civic space is restricted, which is detrimental to democracy.
Our findings also provide further evidence of corporations as powerful political actors (Scherer 
et al., 2014). We add to the literature by providing evidence that companies may not only 
influence public policy by means of lobbying and political party funding, but by accessing 
powerful social networks and influencing public opinion by drawing on and contributing to 
dominant discursive frames to favour policy outcomes, which benefit their vested interests, 
rather than the public interest. This suggests that corporate communication is a hegemonic 
practice motivated by obfuscating conflict and antagonism, rather than providing transparent 
information (Spence, 2007). In line with Cho et al. (2018), we find evidence of  ‘backstage’ 
corporate political activities aimed at i fluencing public policy to serve vested interests 
(manipulation). These provide insights into the strategic nature of the ‘frontstage’ political 
activities in the form of the mobilisation of discursive resources to maintain the status quo on 
nuclear energy and to curb the articulation of anti-nuclear voices (domination).
We invite further research on corporate power as conceptualised by Fleming and Spicer (2014). 
Future research may investigate whether corporate reporting is used for subjectification, i.e., 
the shaping of identities to further corporate interests by suppressing conflict, for example, 
between management and employees. Power may also be mobilised ‘against’ organisations by 
civil society actors, such as stakeholders, NGOS, and social movement groups. Future research 
may employ the concepts of framing and counter-framing as conceptual and analytical tools to 
investigate how dominant discursive frames may be resisted by alternative frames (Lakoff, 
2004). In this respect, the concept of counter-framing may be particularly useful to investigate 
counter or shadow accounting (Laine and Vinnari, 2017; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 
2017). The concepts of framing, counter-framing, framing contests and frame sponsorship may 
also be employed to examine corporate communication in controversial decision-making 
contexts, such as privatisation, mergers and takeovers, and relating to issues and events where 
the opinions of companies and audiences are divided, such as tax avoidance and human rights 
issues. We also call for further research employing the concept of discursive framing to 
conceptualise and analyse the strategic use of language in corporate reports to influence 
audience perceptions of organisational practices, policies, or performance traditionally viewed 
through an impression management or greenwashing lens (e.g., Merkl-Davies et al. 2011; 
Mahoney et al., 2013).
In conclusion, as critical accounting researchers we need to be vigilant to the more invisible 
ways corporations mobilise power to achieve political and economic goals. Discursive framing 
constitutes a particularly insidious use of power (Lukes, 2005), as “frames … shape the way 
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we see the world […,] the goals, we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts 
as a good or bad outcomes of our actions” (Lakoff, 2004, p. xv). This is problematic, because 
they may be used to suppress conflict and stifle debate over controversial issues and thus shrink 
the civic space, which lies at the heart of democracy. However, the civic space can be expanded 
by offering alternative discursive frames which construct a particular issue in a different way, 
thus offering alternative solutions to a problem. “Reframing is social change” (Lakoff, 2004, 
p. xv; emphasis in original).
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Table 1: Timeline of main events in the UK following the Fukushima disaster
Date Event
11 March 2011 Earthquake and tsunami 
12 March 2011 Chris Huhne, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 
commissions Weightman Report
9 May 2011 Release of the Renewable Energy Review by the Committee on 
Climate Change 
18 May 2011 Release of the interim report on implications for the future of nuclear 
power in the UK (Weightman Report)
July 2011 Release of National Policy Statement for Nuclear Energy Generation 
September 2011 Release of final report (Weightman Report)
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Table 2: Pro-nuclear actors
Name Organisation
Corporate 
actors
Vincent de Rivaz Chief Executive Officer of EDF Energy
Alan Raymant Chief Operating Officer of Horizon Nuclear Power
Political 
actors
Chris Huhne Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC)
Mark Higson Chief Executive of the Office for Nuclear 
Development (OND) at the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC)
Regulatory 
actor
Mike Weightman Chief Nuclear Inspector and Head of the Office for 
Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Page 30 of 48Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
Table 3: Private communication – private e-mails (frequency by sender and date)
Political actors Corporate actors Academics
Date
OND/
DECC
DBIS Westing-
house
EDF Horizon NIA Sheffield
University
Total number
of e-mails
13/03/2011 1 4 1 - - - - 6
14/03/2011 4 1 2 1 - - - 8
15/03/2011 2 - - - - 2 - 4
16/03/2011 1 - - 2 3 - 6
17/03/2011 5 1 - 3 1 - 2 12
18/03/2011 1 - 1 - - - - 2
25/03/2011 4 - 2 - - - 1 7
28/03/2011 2 - 1 - - - - 3
30/03/2011 - - 1 - - - - 1
05/04/2011 2 - - 1 - - - 3
07/04/2011 1 - - 1 - - - 2
26/04/2011 - - - 1 - - - 1
Total 23 6 8 9 4 2 3
29 23 1 55
(53%) (42%) (5%) (100%)
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Appendix 1: Public documents
No Date Type of press 
release
Content
1 Corporate documents
EDF CD1 14/03/2011 EDF press release Initial statement on incident in 
Japan
EDF CD2 15/03/2011 EDF press release Further statement on incident in 
Japan
EDF CD3 17/03/2011 EDF press release 
containing CEO 
speech
Statement by Vincent de Rivaz 
following Nuclear Development 
Forum
Horizon CD1 17/03/2011 Horizon press release Statement on recent events in 
Japan
EDF CD4 23/03/2011 EDF press release 
containing CEO 
quotes
Carbon Price Floor
EDF CD5 05/04/2011 EDF press release Statement on Generic Design 
Assessment
EDF CD6 11/04/2011 EDF press release Statement in response to London 
protest
EDF CD7 19/04/2011 EDF press release Submission of evidence to the 
Weightman Report
EDF CD8 19/04/2011 EDF press release EDF Energy and Daikin 
announce partnership
EDF CD9 09/05/2011 EDF press release Reaction to Committee on 
Climate Change’s Renewable 
Energy Review
EDF CD10 16/05/2011 EDF press release Responds to Energy and Climate 
Change Committee report
EDF CD11 18/05/2011 EDF press release Response to the interim 
Weightman Report 
Horizon CD2 18/05/2011 Horizon press release Statement on Weightman 
Interim Report
Horizon CD3 25/05/2011 Horizon press release Statement on new build 
programme
Horizon CD4 16/06/2011 Horizon press release Response to the Interim 
Weightman Report
2 Political documents
PD1 14/03/2011 Letter from Chris 
Huhne to Mike 
Weightman
Commissioning of Weightman 
report
PD2 14/03/2011 DECC release Chris Huhne’s initial response
PD3 14/03/2011 Transcript of speech 
by David Cameron
Initial response; offering help 
and assistance to Japan
PD4 14/03/2011 PM’s office release Initial response; commissioning 
of Weightman report 
PD5 17/03/2011 DECC release Chris Huhne on nuclear power
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Appendix 1: Public documents
No Date Type of press 
release
Content
PD6 22/03/2011 Transcript of speech 
by Chris Huhne
Scottish renewables 
PD7 25/03/2011 Transcript of speech 
by David Cameron
David Cameron on nuclear 
power 
PD8 28/03/2011 Statement by David 
Cameron
Statement to parliament
PD9 15/04/2011 Letter from Mark 
Higson to Mike 
Weightman
Weightman report
PD10 17/05/2011 Letter from Mike 
Weightman to Mark 
Higson 
Weightman report
PD11 18/05/2011 Foreword of 
Weightman report
Results of Weightman report
PD12 18/05/2011 Written Ministerial 
Statement by Huhne
Huhne on release of Weightman 
report
PD13 18/05/2011 DECC release Release of Weightman report
PD14 17/06/2011 Letter from Chris 
Huhne to Mike 
Weightman
Chris Huhne thanks Mike 
Weightman for report 
3 Regulatory documents
RD1 14/03/2011 ONR press release Initial response 
RD2 29/03/2011 ONR release Weightman report
RD3 18/05/2011 ONR release Release of Weightman report
Key: 
EDF - Electricité de France
ONR - Office for Nuclear Regulation; 
DECC - Department of Energy & Climate Change.
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Appendix 2: Pro-nuclear discursive frames in private and public communication
Frames on the Fukushima disaster
(1) Avoiding knee-jerk reactions
Private Communication
“We should not make snap judgements at this point” (Quote Chris Huhne, E1, 13 March 
2011)
“I think that in this country we have a good, long-standing tradition of trying … to base 
public debate on informed assessment […] I know it can be frustrating in terms of those 
who want to come to more rapid conclusions but we should not rush to judgment. Let’s 
wait until we have got the full facts. And I regret the fact that some continental politicians 
do seem to be rushing to judgments on this before we have had a proper assessment.” 
(Quote Chris Huhne, E17, 15 March 2011) 
Public communication
“All have shown clear-headedness in their response – avoiding knee-jerk reactions.” 
(Statement Vincent de Rivaz, EDF CD3, 17 March 2011) 
“I welcome the mandate given to Mike Weightman to report on the facts, to analyse them 
and to draw lessons from them.” (Statement Vincent de Rivaz, EDF CD3, 17 March 2011)
“It is essential that we understand the full facts and implications, both for existing nuclear 
installations and any new reactor programme, as safety is always our number one 
priority.” (Quote Chris Huhne, PD1, 14 March 2011)
“We must establish the facts, which are emerging and not yet fully known.” (Quote Mike 
Weightman, RD1, 14 March 2011)
(2) Lessons learned
Private communication
“But he [Chris Huhne] might, if pressed, wish to say he is asking Mike Weightman to 
provide a full assessment of the implications and lessons to be learnt. If he does it would 
be good if EdF could welcome.” (Mark Higson, E1, 13 March 2011)
“It is much too early to say what the impact and implications are. We will be working 
closely with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and Japan to carefully 
establish what lessons can be learned.” (Quote Chris Huhne, E1, 13 March 2011)
“I have called on the Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr. Mike Weightman, for a thorough report 
on the implications of the situation in Japan and the lessons to be learned.” (Quote Chris 
Huhne, E8, 14 March 2011; E9, 14 March 2011; E16, 15 March 2011)
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Appendix 2: Pro-nuclear discursive frames in private and public communication
“On nuclear, we welcome the fact that the UK Government has asked the safety regulator 
to report on the implications of the events in Japan. EDF Energy is happy to support this 
work in whatever way it can to ensure lessons are learned.” (EDF, E14, 14 March 2011)
“The Energy Secretary has asked Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr. Mike Weightman, for a 
thorough report on the implications of the situation in Japan […] if there are lessons to 
learn, then we will learn them.” (Quote PM David Cameron, E16, 15 March 2011) 
Public communication
“On nuclear, we welcome the fact that the UK Government has asked the safety regulator 
to report on the implications of the events in Japan. EDF Energy is happy to support this 
work in whatever way it can to ensure lessons are learned.” (EDF CD2, 15 March 2011)
“However we welcome the announcement by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Chris Huhne, that the Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr Mike Weightman, will prepare 
a report on the implications and lessons learned from the situation in Japan.” (Horizon 
CD1, 17 March 2011)
“Following the unprecedented events in Japan during the last few days I am writing to 
formally ask you to provide a report to Government on the implications of the situation 
and lessons to be learned for the UK nuclear industry.” (Chris Huhne in letter to Mike 
Weightman, PD1, 14 March 2011)
“Chris Huhne, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, has asked me to provide 
a report on the implications of the unprecedented events in Japan and the lessons to be 
learned for the UK nuclear industry.” (Quote Mike Weightman, RD1, 14 March 2011)
Frames on nuclear energy
(3) Safety
Private communication
“We really need to show the safety of nuclear.” (DBIS official, E4, 13 March 2011)
“It is essential that we understand the full facts and their implications, both for existing 
nuclear reactors and any new programme, as safety is always our number one concern.” 
(Quote Chris Huhne, E8, 14 March 2011; E9, 14 March 2011; E16, 15 March 2011)
“We need a good industry response showing the safety of nuclear – otherwise it could have 
adverse consequences on the market.” (DBIS official, E10, 14 March 2011)
“In our existing stations and in any new nuclear power stations we will continue to ensure 
that safety is our top priority and that we meet all regulatory requirements.” (EDF, E14, 
14 March 2011)
Public communication
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Appendix 2: Pro-nuclear discursive frames in private and public communication
“In our existing stations and in any new nuclear power stations we will continue to ensure 
that safety is our top priority and that we meet all regulatory requirements.” (EDF CD2, 
15 March 2011)
“UK nuclear installations are built with a wealth of safety measures in place to ensure 
that they can withstand a range of natural disasters and avoid causing harm to the public 
or to the environment.” (Horizon CD1, 17 March 2011)
“Safety is and will continue to be the number one priority for existing nuclear sites and for 
any new power stations.” (Chris Huhne, PD6, 22 March 2011)
“We have provided specialist technical advice to the UK Government and ensured there 
are no immediate implications for the safety of the UK nuclear facilities.” (Quote Mike 
Weightman, RD1, 14 March 2011)
(4) Nuclear renaissance
Public communication
“The critical task in front of us today is to deliver a secure, clean and affordable energy 
mix.” (EDF CD3, 17 March 2011)
“EDF Energy is also leading the UK's nuclear renaissance and has published plans to 
build four new nuclear plants, subject to the right investment framework.” (EDF CD6, 11 
April 2011)
“Our challenge is to come up with an energy policy that delivers safe, secure and low-
carbon energy to 2050 and beyond.” (Chris Huhne, PD6, 22 March 2011) 
Key:
CD = Corporate document
E = E-mail
PD = Political document
RD = Regulatory document
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AAAJ-05-2017-2928: 
“Discursive framing in private and public communication by pro-nuclear corporate, political 
and regulatory actors following the Fukushima disaster”
Editor’s comments
Manuscript ID AAAJ-05-2017-2928.R1 entitled "Discursive Framing in Corporate 
Communication following the Fukushima Disaster" which you submitted to the Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, has been reviewed.  The comments of the referee(s) are 
included. Please check both below this email and in any attachments to this email for referee 
reports.
As you will see from these reports, the referees believe that the paper is still not ready to be 
published.  However my inspection of their reports convinces me that the subject itself and 
the quality of your study thus far justify offering you another opportunity to revise and 
resubmit it. 
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to revise the paper.]
Please prioritise the advice of the third arbitrating referee, while at the same time returning 
to the concerns of referee 1 and addressing these as far as you feel able. I encourage you to 
carry out the revisions as suggested by the referees in the reports I have included.
[RESPONSE: 
We have addressed the comments of the third arbitrating referee. This entailed reverting 
to the Introduction of the earlier version of the paper and re-introducing the concept of 
power by using Fleming & Spicer’s (2014) work whose concept of dominance builds on 
Lukes’ (2005) work. We have included a section in the literature review and theoretical 
framework (Section 2.2) which discusses corporations as political actors and which 
outlines the four concepts of power drawing on Fleming & Spicer’s (2014) work.]
As part of your revision process, please produce a revised version of your paper that does 
not exceed 16,000 words (including text, tables and bibliography).
[RESPONSE: 
Our revised version is 15,357 words.]
In the course of undertaking your revision, please be mindful that you are aiming to 
contribute to the interdisciplinary research community’s discourse on your paper’s subject 
area. So it will be important to ensure that you draw on and engage with both prior and latest 
relevant literature as exemplified by such journals as ‘Accounting, Organizations and 
Society’; ‘Critical Perspectives on Accounting’; and ‘Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal’. We welcome your reference to interdisciplinary papers from across 
the full spectrum of accounting research journals.
[RESPONSE: 
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Noted.]
To revise your manuscript, log into https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/aaaj and enter your 
Author Centre, where you will find your manuscript title listed under "Manuscripts with 
Decisions."  Under "Actions," click on "Create a Revision."  Your manuscript number has 
been appended to denote a revision. You will be unable to make your revisions on the 
originally submitted version of the manuscript.  Instead, revise your manuscript using a 
word processing program and save it on your computer.
Once the revised manuscript is prepared, you can upload it and submit it through your 
Author Centre.
When submitting your revised manuscript, you should respond to the comments made by the 
referee(s) in the space provided in 'Author's Response', WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED 
TO THE REFEREES. Please be reminded that ANONYMITY IS REQUIRED and also no 
special formatting will be preserved, i.e. do not put your comments in a table or with 
highlighting etc.  Alternatively, you may provide your response in a separate file as a 
‘SUPPLEMENTARY FILE FOR REVIEW’ which will be shown in the manuscript.
In order to expedite the processing of the revised manuscript, please be as specific as 
possible in your response to the referee(s).  In your replies to each referee, specify how and 
where you have dealt with each of their suggestions, and clarify any areas of divergence or 
inability to adopt specific recommendations.
IMPORTANT:  Your original files are available to you when you upload your revised 
manuscript.  Please delete any redundant files before completing the submission.
Please note that Emerald requires you to clear permission to re-use any material not created 
by you.  If there are permissions outstanding, please upload these when you submit your 
revision.  Emerald is unable to publish your paper with permissions outstanding.
Once again, thank you for submitting your manuscript to the Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal and I look forward to receiving your revision.
[RESPONSE: 
Done.]
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Referee 1’s comments
Thank you for the opportunity to read your revised paper.  I appreciate your efforts to 
respond to the concerns of myself and the third reviewer.  However, my view is that the 
revisions have not substantively addressed these concerns.
[RESPONSE: 
We regret that you still do not see any value in our paper.]
I continue to regard this paper as fundamentally ill-conceived.  The paper is premised on the 
idea that government is supposed to be a neutral arbiter but that, in the case presented, 
government actors have been found to be corresponding with corporate actors.  This is 
described in the paper’s conclusion as ‘a unique case of corporate actors cooperating with 
political and regulatory actors behind the scenes to align their public communication 
strategy as a means of influencing public opinion’ (p. 23).  Similarly, the discussion section 
argues that the ‘findings suggest that the public communication by the UK government, 
energy companies, and the nuclear regulator was not used for accountability purposes, but 
opportunistically to influence public opinion … [which] indicates that political and 
regulatory actors are not necessarily neutral arbiters, who act in the public interest’ (p. 22).  
The paper presents this as if it is a surprising, or even shocking, result.  In contrast, I find it 
mundane.  Regulators and the companies they regulate correspond frequently (it would be 
worrying if they didn’t).  
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for your comments. We have addressed your concern by revising our 
theoretical framework and literature review (Section 2). The revised version draws more 
specifically on the political economy perspective of corporate communication (Section 
2.1), and we have re-introduced the concept of power by drawing on corporations as 
political actors and drawing on the conceptualisation of corporate power by Fleming and 
Spicer (2014) (Section 2.2).
While it may not be surprising that the State is not a neutral arbiter, we highlight the 
problematic aspects arising from it. We provide evidence that pro-nuclear corporate, 
political and regulatory actors purposefully intended to shrink the civic space in which 
open public debates occur. This indicates a lack of transparency and accountability on 
part of both the State and companies, and thus undermines democratic principles.]
The paper refers to the emails obtained by the Guardian newspaper as being “covert”.  This 
implies some kind of underhand conspiracy.  But the emails themselves, as presented in the 
paper, do not point to that.  There is no evidence presented that there was any kind of overt 
effort made to subvert transparent governmental decision-making.  Furthermore, the 
government emails were sent from official email addresses, subject to Freedom of 
Information requests, which is why the Guardian was able to obtain them.  Public officials 
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tend to be very aware of this, so using these email addresses for “covert” communications is 
highly unlikely.  
[RESPONSE: 
We analyse quotes from the e-mails (Section 5.1) to provide evidence of political actors 
explicitly stating the aim to exclude anti-nuclear actors from the public and media debate 
on the future of nuclear power generation in the UK in order to influence public opinion 
on nuclear power, which constitutes power as manipulation. We introduce power as 
manipulation and as domination on p. 4:
The study focuses on power as manipulation and as domination as a means of furthering 
the vested interests of nuclear industry and UK government. Manipulation is a mostly 
invisible form of power, which involves accessing key social networks for agenda setting 
purposes. We focus on corporate, political and regulatory actors tapping into existing 
pro-nuclear social network to agree a joint public communication strategy in order to 
ensure public support for the continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK. By 
contrast, domination entails mobilising discursive and ideological resources in order to 
attain desirable outcomes and goals, while curbing the articulation of other interests and 
voices (Fleming and Spicer, 2014, p. 260).]
The whole exchange only appears to be sinister if you already hold the view that nuclear 
power is wrong.  The paper does not take an explicitly anti-nuclear stance, but the whole 
tone strongly implies that the UK government is wrong to pursue a nuclear power 
programme.  For any reader who is not already committed to a strong anti-nuclear power 
stance, the paper is unconvincing.
[RESPONSE: 
We analyse quotes from the private e-mail exchange focusing on figurative language 
used by pro-nuclear actors (use of theatrical and military metaphors, Section 5.1, p. 
23). The language used provides evidence of the hostile stance of pro-nuclear actors 
against anti-nuclear actors who are depicted as enemies who need to be outwitted and 
defeated.]
Furthermore, the revised paper offers no serious theoretical development of the case.  The 
references to Luke’s invisible power have been removed.  However, the rather loose 
positioning of the paper in the framework of political economy theory offers little in the way 
of theoretical explanation or insight.  Political economy theory is simply held up as a challenge 
to public interest theory (in which regulators are seen as neutral arbiters), so that the case is 
presented as an example of collusion between political and economic interests.  
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for your comments. We have strengthened the theoretical framework by re-
introducing the notion of power. We have linked political economy theory, which 
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regards the State as an interested party, to the concept of corporate power as 
manipulation and domination (Fleming and Spicer, 2014). We view corporate actors as 
exercising power over public policy decision-making by means of manipulation (policy 
agenda setting by accessing existing social networks) and domination (mobilising 
discursive resources to influence public opinion).]
The paper claims that this is a story of accountability because there are email exchanges 
going on between government and these companies, so the decision-making is not 
transparent – i.e. there is an apparent lack of accountability.  But there is no theorisation of 
what kind of accountability could be expected here.  There is no theorisation of how 
accountability is related to discursive framing.  The fact that emails between actors in this 
industry use similar language to each other, and to publicly available reports and press-
releases, does not in itself imply some kind of lack of accountability.  The paper claims to 
say something about the role of the media in ensuring accountability, but this is not 
developed in any meaningful way. 
[RESPONSE: 
We have removed the concept of accountability and refocused the paper on the 
relationship between the State, corporations, and civil society. We view companies and 
the State as acting in their own interests, rather than in the public interest, which shrinks 
the civic space and undermines democratic principles. We introduce this argument on pp. 
1-2:
Public controversies constitute public debates on contested issues and conflicting ideas 
with the aim of influencing policy outcomes. They take place in the civic space, which 
is a site for open public debate and involves participation by individual citizens, groups 
of civil society actors, including social movement groups, NGOs, and the media 
(Castells, 2008). The civic space is “at the heart of democracy”, where “the rights of civil 
society exist alongside other powerful economic and political interests” (Murphy and 
Moerman, 2018, p. 1774).  It plays an important role in “structuring and channeling 
debates over diverse ideas and conflicting interests” (Castells, 2008, p. 78). Conversely, 
stifling public debate over issues of public interest entails shrinking the civic space. This 
is detrimental for democracy, as it denies human and civil rights, jeopardises government 
accountability, silences citizen voices and erodes confidence in government authority 
(Malena, 2015, p. 14).]
Ultimately, I find the arguments of the paper to be contrived, offering no useful contribution 
to the accounting/accountability literature.  
[RESPONSE: 
We hope that you will see more value in our paper and that you will find the arguments 
made more convincing in the new version of the paper which draws on Fleming and 
Spicer’s (2014) conceptualisation of power as manipulation (accessing existing social 
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networks for agenda setting purposes via email) and as domination (drawing on and 
contributing to dominant discursive frames in public communication).]
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Referee 3’s comments
Thank you again for the opportunity to review and engage with this manuscript.  I note that 
it has been substantively revised from the previous version and many of my concerns with 
the previous version of the paper have been resolved.  I think the paper and study is now 
more clearly focused and logical in its presentation and some of the previous concerns 
regarding use of theory etc have been addressed.
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you.]
However, I still note some areas where the manuscript requires further consideration. These 
are not as substantive as with the previous version. They essentially relate to the framing of 
the paper within the literature and strengthening aspects of the study which I think have been 
lost in this version of the paper.  I note these here for the author(s) to reflect on.
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for clearly highlighting further areas for improvement in the paper.  We have 
rewritten the paper based on your feedback which has resulted in the following changes:
(1) We have rewritten the Introduction (Section 1) which reverts back to the original 
focus on nuclear power and legitimacy threats caused by nuclear accidents. The RQ states 
‘How did UK corporate, political, and regulatory actors prevent a public controversy over 
nuclear power in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster?
(2) We have strengthened the theoretical framework by including a discussion of 
corporations as political actors exercising power to achieve either shared or contested 
goals (Section 2.2). 
(3) The focus on companies as political actors has allowed us to theorise the e-mail 
exchange as power as manipulation, thus resulting in a new two-part structure of Section 
5, namely 5.1 Agenda-setting which focuses on power as manipulation and 5.2 
Discursive framing which focuses on power as domination.]
I believe in this version of the paper the framing of the analysis is unclear. This lack of 
clarity takes two forms, each of which, in my opinion, needs to be addressed.
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for pointing out the lack of clarity and inconsistencies.]
First, the focus of analysis in the paper is unclear and I believe problematic.  In many places 
in the paper, including on page 2, the authors state the study is motivated by a question f 
“how companies succeed in averting public controversies and remain legitimate in times of 
crisis”. The author(s) then often refer to the way in which “corporations” or “corporate 
actors” respond.  At other times in the paper the author(s) note that the focus is on corporate, 
Page 44 of 48Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
AAAJ-05-2017-2928: 
“Discursive framing in private and public communication by pro-nuclear corporate, political 
and regulatory actors following the Fukushima disaster”
political and regulatory actors.  For me, the latter is more accurate and needs to be consistent 
throughout the paper.  
[RESPONSE: 
We have changed the title, the abstract, and the research question in line with the focus 
of analysis on corporate, political, and regulatory actors. We have also made changes 
throughout the paper.]
The data set, which I believe is a key strength of the paper (see more below), are the email 
exchanges between corporate, political and regulatory actors. It is also unclear as to whether 
the corporate actors are working on behalf of their individual company or the industry in 
general (not an issue depending on how the paper is framed).  As such, I think the focus of 
the paper is not on the corporate response but rather, importantly, the communication 
between individuals/interested actors. As such, I think some statements as to what the paper 
does are inaccurate.  For example, the first line of the abstract reads “This study examines 
how companies prevent public controversies”.  I do not think the study and the data set 
enables an examination of this.
[RESPONSE: 
By incorporating the concept of power as manipulation and as domination we have 
shifted the focus of analysis on pro-nuclear actors accessing existing pro-nuclear 
networks for agenda setting purposes and to influence public opinion by drawing on and 
contributing to dominant discursive frames We introduce the concept of power as 
manipulation and domination in Section 2.2 and add Section 5.1 when discussing the 
results which focuses on the analysis of power as manipulation by analysing the private 
email exchange by pro-nuclear actors.]
Second, the data set is different and unique, it is not corporate reports, so I am unsure why 
the author(s) are positioning the paper as they do in relation to the reporting research.  Yes, 
this is an important literature to engage with as it addresses the previous reviewers concern 
about the connection to the accounting/accountability literature, but I think the author(s) 
could strengthen the paper by the way they position this study in relation to that literature.  
For me the strength of the study is the focus on what is happening “backstage”.  This is not 
well investigated in the literature and therefore the author(s) have a unique opportunity here. 
As such, I would encourage the author(s) to think more critically and reflectively about how 
this study connects with and adds to the extant literature which they identify.  I think the 
study is undersold at present.  In short, the author(s) do not look at reports, so this is not a 
reporting paper.  I think this is a strength of the paper.  This does not mean that I think the 
author(s) need to change the literature they are connecting with, but rather, rethink the way 
in which they position the paper within that literature to highlight the contribution of this 
work.
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[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for pointing out the uniqueness of your dataset as the key strength of our 
paper. We have refocussed and strengthened our theoretical framework in relation to the 
dataset.
We have revised the theoretical framework and literature review and thus the paper’s 
poisoning in the literature (Section 2). We draw more specifically on the political 
economy perspective of corporate communication (Section 2.1), and we have re-
introduced the concept of power. We view corporations as political actors and 
conceptualise corporate power as manipulation and domination (Fleming and Spicer, 
2014) (see Section 2.2). Our analysis and findings are informed by a focus on these two 
less visible forms of power. 
In the Introduction (p. 3) we situate the paper in the prior literature:
We examine a case where pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors 
cooperated behind the scenes to stifle public debate on nuclear energy in the aftermath 
of the Fukushima disaster. Beelitz and Merkl-Davies (2012) examine how a Swedish 
energy company restored organisational legitimacy following an incident in one of their 
nuclear power plants in Germany by means of analysing managerial discourse (‘CEO-
speak’) in corporate public communication. In contrast, we focus on the responses of 
corporate, political, and regulator actors to a nuclear accident in which none of the actors 
were implicated in nor responsible for, but which threatened the legitimacy of nuclear 
power. Cho et al. (2018) contrast the ‘backstage’ corporate political activities of oil and 
gas firms in the form of lobbying and political party contributions aimed at influencing 
US law to allow oil drilling in environmentally sensitive areas in Alaska with their 
‘frontstage’ discourse on environmental protection. In contrast, we examine the 
‘backstage’ corporate political activities in the form of accessing existing pro-nuclear 
networks for agenda-setting purposes with the aim of agreeing a joint ‘frontstage’ public 
communication strategy on the Fukushima disaster. By tracing discursive frames from 
their inception in private communication (e-mails) to their reproduction in public 
communication (corporate, political and regulatory news releases and documents) and 
their dissemination via the media (newspaper articles), we provide linguistic evidence 
that pro-nuclear corporate, political, and regulatory actors cooperated behind the scenes 
to achieve consistent public pro-nuclear messaging in order to ensure continued public 
support for the continuation of nuclear power generation in the UK.]
The author(s) at various times in the paper refer to a “lack of accountability”.  I would invite 
the author(s) to reflect on this a bit more.  From reading the case study it did not appear that 
in the UK context they were being called to account - required to be accountable.  Furthermore, 
is what is being investigated a lack of accountability, or is it accountability taking a particular 
form?  Taking this further, the disaster did not appear to have much traction in the UK – so 
why is this analysis needed?  Are the author(s) claiming that what they are analysing resulted 
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in the lack of traction in the UK? If so, I think this aspect of the argument could be a little 
stronger.
[RESPONSE: 
We have refocussed the paper from accountability to the relationship between the State, 
corporations and civil society, and on the State and companies as powerful actors 
cooperating to serve their vested interests, rather than public interest. We introduce this 
argument on pp. 2-3:
Public controversies constitute public debates on contested issues and conflicting ideas 
with the aim of influencing policy outcomes. They take place in the civic space, which 
is a site for open public debate and involves participation by individual citizens, groups 
of civil society actors, including social movement groups, NGOs, and the media 
(Castells, 2008). The civic space is “at the heart of democracy”, where “the rights of civil 
society exist alongside other powerful economic and political interests” (Murphy and 
Moerman, 2018, p. 1774).  It plays an important role in “structuring and channeling 
debates over diverse ideas and conflicting interests” (Castells, 2008, p. 78). Conversely, 
stifling public debate over issues of public interest entails shrinking the civic space. This 
is detrimental for democracy, as it denies human and civil rights, jeopardises government 
accountability, silences citizen voices and erodes confidence in government authority 
(Malena, 2015, p. 14).]
Does Table 5 sufficiently show the link between private and public communication?  One 
statement from the emails only is provided. I wonder if the author(s) could be stronger in 
this claim.
[RESPONSE: 
We have moved Table 5 into an appendix (Appendix 2) and incorporated more quotes 
from the private e-mails to provide stronger evidence of intertextual links between 
private and public communication.]
By taking power out of the analysis I think the importance and value of analysing the emails 
is perhaps lost and I would argue that the paper would be strengthened by explicitly identifying 
the uniqueness of this data. This does not mean going back to an analysis of power as in the 
previous version – but a clearer articulation as to why analysing this type of data, considering 
the links between the private and the public is important/useful.
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for this comment. We have re-introduced the concept of power as 
conceptualised by Fleming and Spicer (2014). We conceptualise the private e-mail 
exchange as an exercise of power by accessing existing social networks to influence 
policy agenda setting, i.e., power as manipulation. 
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We focus our attention on the unique dataset by analysing the e-mail exchange (Section 
5.1). The analysis indicates that social actors explicitly stated the aim to marginalise anti-
nuclear actors in the public debate on nuclear power, thus intending to influence policy 
outcomes in their favour.
We appreciate your comment that we had previously undersold the uniqueness of our 
data and our case, and we think that re-introducing the concept of power, especially less 
visible forms of power, helped us to strengthen our theoretical framework as well as our 
analysis and interpretation of findings.]
On page 20 the author(s) talk about the public accountability frame.  I wondered if this could 
come earlier to again provide essential context – this is an important aspect I think and helps 
justify the analysis of emails – indeed, this discussion on page 20 and top of page 21 would 
be useful to come earlier and would help address my above point about the strength of this 
analysis.  
[RESPONSE: 
We have removed the reference to the public accountability frame and refocused the 
analysis of emails on the concept of power as manipulation.]
I do have some slight concerns as to the use of political economy theory and the way it is 
used (or more correctly not used) in the analysis and presentation of findings – indeed, the 
focus is on framing.  However, this discussion does help frame the paper and context and 
therefore I would just invite the author(s) to think if there would be any value in referring 
back to this theory in the final sections of the paper.  
[RESPONSE: 
In our discussion of findings and in the conclusion, we refer back to the political 
economy perspective of corporate communication and prior literature employing this 
theoretical lens in order to interpret our findings and to position our paper and findings 
in this literature.]
Overall, I think that the paper has been substantially improved from the previous version. 
However, I think some of the novelty and what makes this paper and the data set which it 
draws upon has been lost in the process. As such, what I provide above are some comments 
as to how I think the author(s) could “reclaim” some of the novelty of the manuscript. I hope 
they are useful in providing points for the author(s) to consider.
[RESPONSE: 
Thank you for your comments. We hope that changes made in the current version f the 
manuscript have addressed your suggestions and concerns. We feel that based on your 
comments we were able to strengthen our theoretical framework and to focus more 
attention on the unique characteristics of our dataset and case.]
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